Idealists would like to have a world without war! Realists would also like to have a
world without war but will settle for a world without World War? The ideas of Theodore
Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson contend with us today and will continue to do so in the
future.
Donald Kagan's On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace has uplifted me.
At the beginning, I was focusing on why have human beings been fighting wars for so
long and Thucydides's war arising out of "honor, fear, and interest"l and the way that
Kagan wove this in and out ofthe lessons of his book.
It was not till I got to his conclusions that I achieved the epiphany is that there is a way
for the United States to avoid most wars and especially WW?
He offers a way that "the free and spirited people of a still powerful nation [America] will
not allow the world order to be tom up to its disadvantage and their security
endangered.,,2 The choices available to maintain the peace are "to seek to avoid the
crisis by working (my emphasis) to preserve the peace, to act realistically while there is
time,,3 to deter the deterrable or fight a smaller, less costly war, with the undeterrable.
WW? can be avoided.
Deterrence works.
The goal is to make it work for the United States and the toughest challenge ahead is to
reestablish the bipartisan Foreign and Military Policies that the United States had after
WWII. It may not have been perfect but it provided a much better sense of the United
States being Clear, Credible, and Capable. Unfortunately, these messages have changed
with Presidents.
A bipartisan commitment to deterrence will buy us a continuing peace dividend.
My expanded synthesis of Kagan's message is shown below:
We have to stay involved in the world. A retreat to an isolationist position predisposes
you to a reactive posture. We were lucky in WWI and again in WWII. There is no
guarantee that our luck will continue.
We/Allies/Coalition of the Willing need to win the peace in any war. Winning the peace
means that you do not have to fight about the same or similar issues again with the same
adversary or adversaries. The Peace should match the circumstances of the conflict and
the potential and need to make it a good and lasting peace. In today's world, this would
I
On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace, Donald Kagan, Anchor Books, 1995, p. 8
2
Ibid., p. 573
3
Ibid., p. 573
III
tend to be an imposed and supervised peace where you maintain a military presence until
the vanquished adversary or adversaries have a viable, functioning government that is
truly democratic and a working economy that supports its people.
We need to be clear about what our foreign policy goals are and what our national
interest is. We need to let the world and our people know what they are and why they are
important to us. Clarity helps to prevent mistakes on the part of adversaries.
We need to maintain our military capability so we have the power to project and use
force against our enemies when and where needed.
We need to proj ect that we say what we mean and mean what we say and that we do have
the will to use our power where and when necessary. This is credibility.
Deterrence works. It is cheaper than war. It helps to maintain the status quo, which is in
our favor and can remain so if we follow the lessons shown above.
We need to work with other states to create a better way of actualizing the idealistic
concept of collective security in the United Nations or create a new forum that may better
address the current defect in "collective security", namely, "the nations of the world tend
to disagree either about the nature ofthe threat or about the type of sacrifice they are
prepared to make to meet it,,4
The "Coalition of the Willing" is not a bad way to describe what is needed. We can not
be held hostage to a United Nations that will allow other states to strike others or us with
Weapons of Mass Destruction when this can be prevented by deterrence or preemptive
action. We also need to find the idealistic phraseology to sell it to more of the American
public as well as to world public opinion. We need to get our market share for this
concept up in the 70% range.
We need to have the continual political will and popular support to follow these
guidelines.
________________________________________
4
Ibid., p. 53
1
POSC51 - Spring Final Exam due Monday, May 6,2003 @ 5:00 PM
1.
1. Discuss the success of the
19th
Century Balance of Power that culminated in WWI.
The
19th
Century Balance of Power was very successful. It was not designed to eliminate
all war or all conflict but it was designed to prevent another great war among the
European powers. None of the powers wanted a repeat of the Napoleonic wars that were
ending ..
"The five men (Prince von Mettemich - Austria, Prince von Hardenberg - Prussia,
Talleyrand -France, Tsar Alexander I - Russia, and Lord Casterleagh -Great Britain)
achieved what they had set out to do. After the Congress of Vienna, Europe experienced
the longest period of peace it had ever known. No war at all took place among the Great
Powers for forty years, and after the Crimean War of 1854, no general war for another
.
,,1
SIxty.
"This international order, which was created more explicitly in the name of the balance oj
power than any other before or since, relied the least on power to maintain itself.,,2
Of prime importance to the success of this system was that the vanquished Napoleonic
France was brought into the process. The peace terms for France were lenient. The
victors were very interested in "Winning the Peace".
Other factors that helped to insure its success were:
The five powers were roughly equal.
Power was easier to measure in 1815.
Power was more equally distributed.
Power and its exercise by states and statesmen was roughly insulated from public
opinion which allowed the states to balance quickly "on the fly" without the
constraints of public opinion. This gave the states needed diplomatic flexibility.
"But the most important reason was that the Continental countries were knit together
by a sense of shared values. There was not only a physical equilibrium, but also a
moral one. Power and justice were in substantial harmony.,,3
Territorial concessions were made at the expense of smaller states
During the early part of this period, the Historical Memory of the honors of the
Napoleonic Wars helped the powers to back away from the brink of potential conflict
or greater conflict.
2. Discuss the breakdown of the
19th
Century Balance of Power that culminated in WW:
The key question in Balance of Power considerations is how the Balance or Power reacts
to changing circumstances over time.
1
Diplomacy, Henry Kissinger, Touchstone, Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 79
2
Ibid., p. 79
3
Ibid., p. 79
The five powers were not able to contend with forces of history during the period from
the Concert of Europe to the beginning ofWWI.
Forces were emerging that States were not able to control. The States also made
decisions that worked against the Balance of Power that ultimately resulted in WWI.
The Industrial Revolution, Nationalism, greater democracy for the common man and the
unification of Germany and to a lesser degree of Italy unleashed forces and desires that
threatened the Balance of Power. Great Britain's retreat into "splendid isolation" that did
not allow it to reverse in time was the capstone that sealed the fate of the Balance of
Power as an effective mechanism to avoid another major war among the great powers.
Culture was no longer as homogeneous as it had been. Nationalism helped the Germans
but worked against the Romanovs of Russia and the Hapsburgs of Austria.
The Kaiser's replacement of Bismarck in March 1890 and his shift away from the
policies of Bismarck lead to WWI.
"Bismarck had never attempted to go beyond the traditions of the balance of power. His
successors, however, were clearly not comfortable with the balance of power, and never
seemed to understand that, the more they magnified their own strength, the more they
would encourage the compensating coalitions and arms buildups inherent in the system of
European equilibrium,,4
3. Was its success until the breakdown into WWI due exclusivelv to:
a. svstemic considerations?
A concentration of events and people at the Concert of Vienna made the Balance of
Power work.
The five powers were roughly equal.
Power was easier to measure in 1815.
Power was more equally distributed.
Power and its exercise by states and statesmen was roughly insulated from public
opinion which allowed the states to balance quickly "on the fly" without the
constraints of public opinion. This gave the states needed diplomatic flexibility.
-Sense of shared values. Statesmen thinking on the same wavelength.
Territorial concessions were made at the expense of smaller states
During the early part of this period, the Historical Memory of the horrors of the
Napoleonic Wars helped the powers to back away from the brink of potential conflict
or greater conflict.
b. the uneven effects of technical and economic change?
The powers basically balanced out in terms of total power capability.
4
Ibid., pp. 171-172
c. the nature of the German State?
At the beginning of this period, there was no German state. Pmssia was the least of the
Five Powers and this helped the balance by distributing the "German" power potential
through a number of smaller German states that had the capacity for independent action.
d. or a combination of factors drawn from all three levels of analysis?
All in all, this was a very fortuitous time. The five powers did fight wars among
themselves; the Franco-Pmssian War, the Crime an War, Germany and Austria, but they
were all limited in scope and did not grow into larger wars. The Balance of Power
system worked at this level. The regimes, though all were not alike, were rational and
their objectives somewhat limited. The leaders also fit into this mold as well.
4. Was its breakdown into WWI due exclusively to:
Nye does well in his use of tables and time lines in his Understanding International
Conflicts - An Introduction to Theory and History,
The "Stmctural Changes in the Pre-World War I Balance of Power
1815-1870
Loose Multipolarity
1870-1907
Rise of Germany
1907-1914
Bipolarity of Alliances"s
and "Process ofthe Pre-World War I Balance of Power
1815-1822
Concert of Europe
1822-1854
Loose Concert
1854-1890
Bismarck's Revised Concert
1890-1914
The Loss of Flexibility,,6
form a good backdrop for this question.
a. systemic considerations?
The unification of Germany created a powerful state in the center of Europe, which then
felt its security, threatened because it was surrounded by potentially hostile powers,
Russia on the west, Austria to the south, and France to the east.
Systemic considerations, in themselves, do not necessarily have to cause the Balance of
Power to break down. Much depends on how the regime and statesmen adjust to the
systemic changes, which are the keys to peace and war. The system itself is neutral.
b. the uneven effects of technical and economic change?
S
Understanding International Conflicts. An Introduction to Theory and History,
4th
Edition, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Longman Classics in Political Science, 2003, p. 65
6
Ibid., p. 66
________________________________________
All the powers were feeling and benefiting from the Industrial Revolution but not at the
same rate. Great Britain was the leader in this area but Germany was catching up quite
rapidly. Russia and Austria lagged behind, especially Russia. This also applied in the
area of technology and its use. Railroads became central to Germany's ability to project
power to its frontiers.
c. the nature of the German State?
Regime type matters, Image 2, and this is the case for the new Germany. It was an
authoritarian state with liberal, democratic trappings.
"One scholar rightly calls the German Empire, an autocratic monarchy with a few
parliamentary trimmings ... it is not an exaggeration to say that [in foreign affairs] the
Reich Constitution endowed the House of Hohenzollem with an almost absolutist
position.,,7
"Neither the Budesrat (Upper House) nor the Reichstag (Lower House) ... had much
influence on the shaping of foreign policy, or its military and diplomatic tools. The
constitution placed these responsibilities directly in the hands of a single man, the
Kaiser."s
d. or a combination of factors drawn from all three levels of analvsis?
The Balance of Power System became unstable for a number of reasons.
The unification of Germany made it the potential hegemon of Europe
Austro-Hungary and Russia wanted to have or control the remnants of the Ottoman
Empire that were trying to break away from the Ottoman.
France had lost Alsace- Lorraine and wanted it back.
Italy wanted parts of Austro-Hungary that had an Italian population.
Germany had not followed Bismarck's policy of maintaining an alliance with Russia.
Great Britain was reluctant to leave its "splendid isolation".
The statesmen and regimes did not work hard enough to bring it back into a balance that
would have averted WWI.
Regimes matter. The German, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian had too much freedom of
action in terms of being controlled and influenced by their citizens and Great Britain and
France were constrained by their publics.
Most importantly, leaders are influential as well and the Kaiser put the collision of WWI
on tract and the other leaders did not do enough to deter it.
5. Why didn't the French under Napoleon III balance effectively against German
UnifIcation that significantly altered the imbalance of power in Europe to their
disadvantage?
7
On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace, Donald Kagan, Anchor Books, 1995, p. 86
8
Ibid., p. 86
________________________________________
The French, what can you say, you just have to love them.
"Napoleon (France) saw the Metternich system as humiliating to France and as a
constraint upon its ambitions. He was successful in disrupting the Holy Alliance by
driving a wedge between Austria and Russian during the Crime an War. But he (France)
did not know what to do with his triumph. From 1853 to 1871 relative chaos prevailed as
the European order was reorganized. When this period ended, Germany emerged as the
strongest power on the Continent. Legitimacy - the principle ofthe unity of
conservative rulers that had mitigated the harshness ofthe balance-of-power system
during the Metternich years - turned into an empty slogan. Overestimatin2 France's
stren2th, he had encouraged every upheaval, convinced that he could turn it to France's
benefit.
In the end, international politics came to be based on raw power. And in such a world,
there was an inherent 2ap between France's ima2e of itself as the dominant nation
of
Europe and its capacity to live up to it - a 2ap that has bli2hted French policy to
this
day.,,9
(I have added the underlining and bold type.)
6. What does that suggest about the problem of misperceptions in international politics?
Clarity of perception is what is most needed at all time. If you are able to view the
situation clearly, you have a much better chance to optimize your choices to ensure
results that are most favorable to you.
"The assumption of accurate perceptions is therefore open to question. The inherent
difficulty of determining the offensive/defensive balance and the alleged tendency ofthe
military to prepare for the last war instead rather than the next one may result in some
+:
d'
.
,,10
pro.loun mlsperceptlOns
Statesmen have to constantly remind themselves as best they can to ask questions about
what they are facing. Are the analogies and lessons of the past appropriate to the
situation at hand? Easy to say, difficult to do under time constraints, especially when you
are the one who has to make the decision.
Good, honest, unbiased as possible, staff work is critically important to the statesman.
"If he has correctly identified a major cause, and if other factors are either unimportant or
can be neglected because they are constant in all cases he will confront, he can indeed use
one event as an analogy to many others."ll
9
Diplomacy. HeillY Kissinger, Touchstone, Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 119
to
The OffensivelDefensive Balance of Military Technolo?y, Jack S. Levy, June 1984, Conflict After the
Cold War. Arguments on Causes of War and Peace,
2nd
Editions, Edited by Richard K. Betts, Longman,
Pearson Education, Inc., 2002,
p.
429
t1
How Decision-Makers Learn from History, Robert Jervis, 1976, Classics of Intemational Relations,
3'd
Edition, Edited by John A. Vasquez, Prentice Hall, 1986, p. 166
Decision-makers often "do not examine a variety of analogies before selecting the one
that they believe sheds the most light on their situation. Instead, because of their
predispositions they see the present as like recent and dramatic events without carefully
considering alternative model or the implications of this way of perceiving. They thereby
fail to apply fully their intelligence to some of the most important questions that they
face.,,12
You need to meld probability of success or least loss with consequences with reasonable
distinctions on the desired outcome. This can help the Statesman to see through the fog
of ambiguity.
a. Kissinger's explanation ofWWI and the lessons to be learned
Kissinger would say that WWI was the result ofthe failure ofthe balance of power to
balance. The balance of power works best when it is flexible under these conditions.
"First, each nation must feel itself free to align with any other state, depending upon the
circumstances of the moment ...
Second, when there are fixed alliances but a balancer sees to it that none of the existing
coalitions becomes predominant - the situation after the Franco-Russian treaty, when
Great Britain continued to act as balancer and was in fact being wooed by both sides.
Third, when there are rigid alliances and no balancer exists, but cohesion of the alliances
is relatively low so that, on any given issue, there are either compromises or changes in
alignment." 13
"The international order after 1891 did 110tturn rigid after a single challenge. It took
fifteen years before each of the three elements of flexibility was destroyed in sequence.
After the formulation of the Triple Entente, the balance of power ceased to function.
Tests of strength became the rule and not the exception. Diplomacy as the art of
compromise ended.,,14
"With diplomatic flexibility no longer possible, the only way to alter the balance of
power was by adding more arms or by victory in war.,,15
"The leaders of all the major countries simply did not grasp the implications of the
technology at their disposal, or ofthe coalitions they were feverishly constructing. They
seemed oblivious to the huge casualties of the still relatively recent American Civil War,
and expected a short, decisive conflict. It never occurred to them that the failure to make
their alliances correspond to rational political objectives would lead to the destruction of
civilization as they knew it. Each alliance had too much at stake to permit the traditional
Concert of Europe diplomacy to work. Instead, the Great Powers managed to construct a
diplomatic doomsday machine, though they were unaware of what they had done.,,16
12
Ibid., p. 171
13
Diplomacy, Henry Kissinger, Touchstone, Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 182
14
Ibid., p. 182
15
Ibid., p. 194
16
Ibid., p. 200
7
b. Kagan's image two explanations ofWWI and the lessons to be learned
Regime type matters. "Wilhelmine Germany was not just another European nation
seeking to maintain its national interest or even to advance it by means tolerable to its
neighbors. From the 1890's imperial Germany was a fundamentally dissatisfied power,
eager to disrupt the status quo to achieve is expansionist goals, by bullying if possible, by
'f
,,17
war
1
necessary.
Statesmen matter as well. "Grey (Britain) exaggerated his ability to playa "floating
role." Though he never intended to abandon his friends, by attempting to mediate
between the groups of powers, he may have encouraged Bethmann (Germany) to gamble
on his (Britain's) ultimate neutrality.,,18
Kagan and others think that Wilhelmine Germany's leadership was deterrable. "The only
sure deterrent of any German leader who was not insane was the certainty ofthe presence
on the Western front, soon after the outbreak of war, of an army large enough to make a
quick victory impossible, an army of such size as the British ultimately put into the field
too late to deter war but just in time to avoid defeat.,,19
The lesson to be learned is that deterrence, when possible, is worth the cost to all parties
and that a great power needs to be able to deter others at all time.
c. Spiral model's explanation ofWWI and the lessons to be learned (see syllabus and
Betts Reader)
Tuchman's The Guns of August lays out the Spiral Theory as a history that reads as a
novel.
As a description of how events "spiraled out of control" after the assassination in
Sarajevo, events did take on a life of their own. This does not mean that events had to
keep marching on towards a great war as they did.
Briefly, the Great Powers in trying to meet their security needs through alliances, set off a
chain of events that spiraled out ofthe control of the people and countries involved.
There was a belief that the first country to go on the offensive would win, a defensive
posture would lose, and allies had to be supported which created the situation that
resulted in all the Great Powers eventually mobilizing. Germany, the only country with
adversaries on both sides of its boundaries, had the most urgent need to mobilize and
fight once things started. The Schlieffen plan was designed to take the French out by
going through Belgium, and with France out of the war, the army could wheel to fight the
Russians on the Eastern Front.
I think for many of the statesmen and people who had been worried about a war, this time
was as good as any. Also the Arch-Duke and his wife had been assassinated.
17
On the Ori2:ins of War and the Preservation of Peace, Donald Kagan, Anchor Books, 1995, p. 209
18
Ibid., p. 211
19
"The German threat to Russia - that it would soon be forced to mobilize, which meant
war, which meant the Schlieffen Plan's offensive, if Russia did not stop the partial
mobilization against Austria-Hungary - underscores the importance ofthe alliance
commitment in Berlin's ca1culations.,,2o
The lessons that could be considered from the Spiral Model were that continued
communications with your adversary or adversaries were important to find out what they
really want. You do not want your allies to put you into a position of danger. You should
work towards allaying the fears of your adversaries.
The model also called for the aggrieved party to practice forbearance in the face of
continued and increasing threats.
d. Kissinger's thoughts concerning the spiral model.
Kissinger would say that the Spiral Model describes what happened but that the
breakdown in the balance of power system was the cause that allowed WWI to happen.
"By 1914, the confrontation between Austria-Hungary on the one side, and the Triple
Entente on the other, had turned deadly earnest. The statesmen of all the major countries
had helped to construct the diplomatic doomsday machine that made each succeeding
crisis progressively more difficult to solve. Their military chiefs had vastly compounded
the peril by adding strategic plans, which compressed the time available for decision-
making. Since military plans depended on speed and the diplomatic machinery was
geared to its traditional leisurely pace, it became impossible to disentangle the crisis
under time pressure. To make matters worse, the military planners had not 'adequately
explained the implications of their handiwork to their political colleagues.,,2!
Military planning had in effect become autonomous.,,22
"It required only
one
mobilization by a major power to start the doomsday machinery for
all ofthem.,,23
"Ironically, by the time the decisive battles were being fought on the Western front,
Austrian troops had still not ,taken the offensive against Serbia.,,24
e. Kagan's thoughts concerning the spiral model.
Kagan would not dispute the dates and times outlined in the Spiral Model but he would
not agree that each step had to follow the course that it did. There were many times that
the Spiral could have been stopped if Great Britain had stepped in forcefully,
20
1914 Revisited, Scott D, Sagan, 1986Conflict After the Cold War. Arguments on Causes of War and
Peace,
2nd
Editions, Edited by Richard K. Betts, Longman, Pearson Education, Inc., 2002
2]
Diplomacy, Henry Kissinger, Touchstone, Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 201
22
Ibid., p. 202
23
Ibid., p. 203
Austria-Hungary, in the face ofthe extreme provocation of the assassination on June 28,
1914 did not immediately go to war with Serbia. "Berchtold (Austrian Prime Minister)
was cautious. He knew that the Emperor Franz Josef was not eager for war and that the
Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza would be against it; beyond that, he was far from sure
what Germany's attitude would be.,,25
On July 5, 1914 Kaiser William II, on his own recognizance committed Germany to the
Austria's desire to invade Serbia. He "would stand by our (Austria-Hungary's) side ....
The Kaiser emphasized the need for quick action: "this action must not be delayed.,,,,26
It was not until July 19, 1914 that Prime Minister Tisza gave his consent for a war with
Serbia.
The war potential was moving forward but it was not yet a final thing.
It basically became unstoppable once Russia started its mobilization but even at this late
date, Great Britain could have come forward clearly and without equivocation and may
have been able to prevent WWI from occurring at this time.
II.
1. Compare the origins ofWWI with WWII
The origin ofWWI is found in the emergence of a unified Germany that challenged the
old order of Europe. "Emergence of a new power, whose strength and dynamism has
threatened the old order, challenging it to find a new equilibrium.,,27 "The unification of
Germany, concluded in 1871, created an entirely new international situation.,,28
"Germany's unification was carried out by Prussia under the leadership of Otto von
Bismarck, and it was accomplished by force. (My emphasis) ... Suddenly the center of
Europe was occupied by a new nation that had in swift succession decisively beaten two
of the other four charter members of the Concert of Europe. Its population was greater
than all but Russia's; its people were well educated and hard working; its resources ...
had been increased greatly by the acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine from France ... Finally,
the Germans had just demonstrated that they had the most powerful army in Europe.,,29
Germany still faced a security dilemma. "France was still wealthy and strong but bitterly
resentful of its defeat, and where many Frenchmen burned for vengeance to recover their
lost provinces .... Germany's greatest disadvantage came from geography. Unprotected
by seas, like the island of Great Britain, or by vast spaces, like Russia, Germany sat in the
center of Europe surrounded by potential enemies, especially between a hostile France
25
On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace, Donald Kagan, Anchor Books, 1995, pp. 187-188
26
Ibid., p. 189
27
Ibid., p. 83
28
Ibid.,
p.
84
29
and a powerful Russia, with no defensible borders to the east and none to protect its new
t . th
t ,,30
conques s
III
ewes.
"The emergence of the new empire had shattered the old international system.
Germany's, and Europe's challenge was to create a new one into which it would fit
comfortably.,,3l
Deterrence would have worked against this Germany because the statesmen in power
were deterrable.
The origins of WWII, the sequel, contain those that had lead to WWI because they had
neither been settled on the battlefield in the west or by the Peace Treaty of Versailles.
The origins of WWII also included.
The Treaty of Versailles offended the "honor" of the German people.
Ideology matters, Fascism, Communism, and Nazism were new and influenced the
course of events.
The failure of the United States to be a part of the League of Nations.
Most of all, Hitler, a man with a messianic vision and the will to move this vision
forward was able to take absolute power in Germany.
Hitler was not deterrable.
Fatigue on part ofthe "victors".
The Soviet Union was kept out of the process.
The Great Depression.
3.
Contrast the origins ofWWI with WWII
The main contrast to me to me is that there was the recognition that Hitler and Hitler's
Germany posed a real threat to all concerned but that nothing was done to deal with the
problem while it was still manageable.
Before WWI, people may not have had the same clear picture. Before WWII, you had
the prophet Churchill and various Prench governments seeing the danger. Churchill was
not in power and the French could not, would not, act to save themselves.
You could say it was a perverse form of the Spiral Model, a chain of inaction that
allowed Hitler to get to the point where another Great War was the only option.
3. Is there indeed a contrast?
There is a contrast. At the start ofWWI there were 5 players:
Great Britain, a democracy
France, a democracy
Russia, an autocracy
Germany, an autocracy with a constitutional monarchy veneer
30
Ibid., p. 85
31
Ibid., p. 85
________________________________________
Page 15
11
Austria-Hungary, a dying autocracy
At the start ofWWII, there were only 4 players:
Great Britain, a democracy
France, a democracy
Soviet Russia, a totalitarian, messianic communist state
Germany, a totalitarian state with a messianic leader espousing National Socialism,
aimed primarily to the German people
And of these players, the Soviet Union appeared to be on the sidelines but in actuality it
had been an ally for many years.
Added to this mix between the wars, you have the exhausted states of France and
England, being unable or unwilling to confront Hitler's Germany when they could.
4. Or do both wars illustrate the failure of Western Democracies to deter Germany
robustly enough?
Both world wars could have been prevented through deterrence. Diplomacy, over time in
my opinion, could have addressed the various issues that the states had with each other
without going to war or spilling blood, definitely a great war could have been prevented.
France may even have preempted Hitler if they had stayed with the following decision.
"Raymond Ponicare, its wartime President, took over as Prime Minister and decided in
favor of unilateral enforcement of the Versailles reparations clause. In January 1923,
French and Belgium troops occupied the Ruhr, Germany's industrial heartland, without
consulting the other Allies.,,32
Once Hitler was in power, France could have deterred Hitler on its own, and probably
have caused his downfall, with little or no blood, by using force to remove German
troops from the Rhineland after they had occupied it on Friday, March 7, 1936.
At the end of September 1938, Britain and France had their last chance to deter Hitler and
probably cause his downfall as well, by being willing to go to war to save the Czech
democracy. This mayor may not have involved the spilling of blood; it definitely would
have been less costly than what followed. Their willingness to abandon Czechoslovakia
also caused the allies to lose 8 divisions of Czech troops and the Skoda Arms Works.
This is why the word Munich still leaves a foul taste in ones mouth.
a. with the main lesson being the imperative of peacetime lJreparedness?
Democracies need to let potential adversaries know that they are willing to fight for their
national interest and to let them know where these boundaries are as well as where the
gray ones are as well.
32
Diplomacy, Henry Kissinger, Touchstone, Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 267
________________________________________
Page 16
12
Democracies in particular need "to understand that the preservation of peace requires
active effort, planning, the expenditure of resources, and sacrifice.,,33
b. a clear commitment to vital geopolitical regions?
It is imperative that you let your potential adversaries know your clear commitment to
your geopolitical interests. This can save "Much blood, sweat, and tears" for all
concerned. Iraq may not have gone into Kuwait in the first place if we had given clear
messages and continued to say the same thing. The same is about Korea.
It is also important that a national interest of an ally is your national interest as well and
that your adversaries should know it, too.
c. a credible commitment to vital geopolitical regions?
To be credible, you need to have both the POWER and the WILL to back up any CLEAR
commitment that you have made.
Having the power while giving off mixed messages that impute on the credibility of your
will, is a proven recipe for disaster that invites others to miscalculate and for them to be
offended when you finally resort to force to correct or to improve the situation in your
favor.
5. Even ifvou think that the spiral model better explains WWI than Kagan's, was it not a
mistake to applv the lessons derived from it --- the need for greater conciliation and
restraint in crisis --- precisely the wrong lesson for dealing with Hitler in the 1930s?
You really need to think deeply concerning the players, either states or their regime type
or their statesmen, when answering this question. I for one think that the Image 1,
Personalities of Leaders, Nye's way oflooking at certain things are extremely important.
Different players are different. Some can be reasoned with (are deterrable and rational)
and there are those that cannot be reasoned with (are not deterrable even though rational
and are not deterrable and whom we would consider irrational).
In the Spiral Model, if accepted, there was no time available for the conciliation of
diplomacy to work. There was time for restraint to be exercised by all parties but it was
not used or if used, it was used inappropriately. The Kaiser could have said not now but
didn't. Great Britain exercised reverse restraint by urging caution instead of saying not
now and that we are with France and Russia.
The players prior to WWI were rational and deterrable.
Applications that might have helped prevent WWI derived from the Spiral Model might
have worked prior to WWI or they could have whetted the appetite for more, even when
dealing with deterrable adversaries.
33
On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace, Donald Kagan, Anchor Books, 1995, p. 567
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13
This much I know is true, applying Spiral Model ideas to Hitler was like throwing
gasoline on a fire in an attempt to put it out.
Hitler's "honor and interest" were not allayed by appeasement. It only helped to confirm
his contempt for the democracies that he was facing and that he could read and anticipate
how far the French and British could be pushed with no cost to him or Germany. In time,
even the German Military came to accept that the allies, especially Britain, would not call
Hitler's bluffs.
Conciliation/appeasement led into a downward spiral to war, exactly what Britain did not
want to happen.
Britain's misunderstood interest in restraining France's desire for self-preservation was
also self defeating. Britain did not want to understand that they would be helping France
against Germany in the end. By ignoring this, their urging restraint on France, further
reduced the needed French will to deter Germany and then Hitler with force created the
situation where both Britain and France backed themselves into a comer to fight at
possibly the worst possible time for them for the unrealistic cause of Poland.
In Hitler's mind, they had readily given up the 8 Czech divisions when they had a chance
to stop him, why would they fight for Poland?
He also legitimately thought, even if France fought, would Great Britain really fight?
7. What does this suggest about the pitfalls of learning from history?
As you go through all the reading with its different exposition of the facts, through the
various lenses of the authors, things tend to get blurry because history does tend to repeat
itself so there are lessons to be learned. There also seems to be the pattern of applying
the lesson of one scenario to the wrong one with bad or inappropriate results.
It also seems that if you look backwards far enough, usually one or two periods behind,
you come up with models that work for the here and now with some promise.
I have been unable to locate in the reading the discussion on how we all filter the
information we receive to fit our preconceived notions or philosophy of life. This is not
necessarily bad because it enables you to make decisions quickly. It is not necessarily
good because it tends to make you more resolute in your decision and less likely to
change or adapt to new circumstances.
The importance of this course with all its varied readings is to make you aware that many
reasonable and intelligent people can look at a situation and come up with different
answers and solutions. Some solutions are better than others are, some are just totally
correct for the circumstance, and some fit better for your personality and belief systems.
This course gives you wide exposure that reminds you that there are other answers
besides your own that can be tested in terms of probable results and their probability of
success.
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14
The Spread of Nuclear Weapons - A Debate Renewed by Sagan and Waltz can look at
the same situation/problem and can come up with diametrically different answers based
on their perception on the spread of nuclear weapons. It is interesting to see where they
agree, disagree, and their convergence on the issue of nuclear proliferation.
One point is that we have had no direct war among the currently great powers since the
atomic bombs were used in Japan in 1945. That is currently 58 years of peace and
counting.
This is a book that needs to be read and understood by the policy makers in China,
Russia, North Korea, and the United States. There is a clock ticking for making a
decision on what to do about North Korea, and if the decision is made to make sure that
they do not become a nuclear power and proliferator, the question of when and how this
threat is to be removed. If the United States does not want North Korea to have or sell
nuclear weapons, we need to move sooner instead of later. If our decision is to let them
become a nuclear power and proliferator, we should also do that quickly.
7. Does the relative success of the Vienna system of the
19th
century versus the disaster
of Versailles prove that harshness does not pay?
The relative success of the Congress of Vienna was due in large measure to the fact that it
was not harsh.
First and foremost, France was invited to be part of the negotiations. This was made
easier by the fact that Napoleon was on Elba when the deliberations started and Louis
XVIII was now the head of France.
"Creating the general balance of power proved relatively simple .... Since the idea of
national self-determination had not yet been invented, they were not the least concerned
with carving states of ethnic homogeneity out of the territory reconquered from
Napoleon. Austria was strengthened in Italy, and Prussia in Germany. The Dutch
Republic acquired the Austrian Netherlands (mostly present day Belgium). France had to
give up all conquests and return to the "ancient frontiers" it had possessed before the
Revolution. Russia received the heartland of Poland. (In conformity with its policy of
not making acquisitions on the Continent, Great Britain confined its territorial gains to
the Cape of Good Hope at the tip of southern Africa.),,34
"The Versailles settlement was stillborn because the values it extolled clashed with the
incentives needed to enforce it: the majority of the states required to defend the
agreement considered it unjust in one way or another.,,35 This is not a good beginning fOI
a peace treaty that is to keep the peace.
The Treaty of Versailles with its "War Guilt" clause, reparations, dismemberment of
Germany that left many Germans in newly created states, reparations, and disarmament
provisions, made it hard for the Germans to accept.
Keeping them out of the proceedings and the League of Nations were also bad ideas.
34
Diplomacy, Hemy Kissinger, Touchstone, Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 79
35
Ibid., p. 244
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15
One question that I have not found the answer for is why were not the Germans
exhausted by the war the way the French and English were? Answers that come to mind
are that their sense of "honor" was outraged by the treaty and that this energized them,
another could be that the war had not been fought on their soil, the German Military had
adroitly passed the buck on to who had lost the war by having the Kaiser abdicate so the
newly formed Weimar Republic could possibly secure better terms than the Kaiser could.
It could also be that due to their larger population, they could endure the large number of
casualties without it being so hard on their population and country.
This would give rise to the "stab in the back" theory as the German military retreated in
good order back to Germany.
8. Or can you make a case for even greater severity toward Germany after WWI based
on the successful WWII model?
The French certainly wanted a more severe treaty because even in defeat, Germany was
still the most powerful country in Europe and it was their neighbor. French desire for the
United States and Wilson stifled greater severity.
The Versailles Agreement could have been made to work if its terms had been enforced
or when it became apparent it was not going to be enforced, a preemptive dissolution on
the part of the Allies to form an new understanding, possibly under the auspices of the
League of Nations could have been a good alternative.
A steadily eroding enforcement of the treaty which was what the Germans wanted and
which the Allies did not redress, was the worst of all possible worlds. The treaty still
fueled German anger while its ability to provide security for France eroded.
The Allies in WWII rectified their mistakes. This shows that you can learn from history
and apply the right lessons.
We did the following:
Unconditional Surrender, the Germans would know that they had lost on the
battlefield and the German Military signed the surrender documents.
Nuremberg trials, ex post facto legislation to try German leaders for war crimes that
lead to the execution of the top people.
We chose their form of government, constitution and their leadership
We divided their country and capital into four zones of occupation.
We kept our military forces there to assure good behavior, in fact, they are still there
today.
This is harshness.
Once we were satisfied that things were moving in the right direction. We helped them
form their own government and state. We also provided aid to rebuild the country in the
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16
form of the Marshall Plan. This has worked very well for the Germans who are currently
enjoying their longest period of peace ever.
9. What lessons should the United States learn from both World Wars, collectively, as
guides to contemporary U.S. foreign policy?
The lessons that have been learned and will continue to be applicable to United Sates
Foreign Policy are:
We have to stay involved in the world. A retreat to an isolationist position predisposes
you to a reactive posture. We were lucky in WWI and again in WWII. There is no
guarantee that our luck will continue.
We/Allies/Coalition of the Willing need to win the peace in any war. Winning the peace
means that you do not have to fight about the same or similar issues again with the same
adversary or adversaries. The Peace should match the circumstances of the conflict and
the potential and need to make it a good and lasting peace. In today's world, this would
tend to be an imposed and supervised peace where you maintain a military presence until
the vanquished adversary or adversaries have a viable, functioning government that is
truly democratic and a working economy that supports its people.
We need to be clear about what our foreign policy goals are and what our national
interest is. We need to let the world and our people know what they are and why they are
important to us. Clarity helps to prevent mistakes on the part of adversaries.
We need to maintain our military capability so we have the power to project and use
force against our enemies when and where needed.
We need to project that we say what we mean and mean what we say and that we do have
the will to use our power where and when necessary. This is credibility.
Deterrence works. It is cheaper than war. It helps to maintain the status quo, which is in
our favor and can remain so if we follow the lessons shown above.
We need to work with other states to create a better way of actualizing the idealistic
concept of collective security in the United Nations or create a new forum that may better
address the current defect in "collective security", namely, "the nations ofthe world tend
to disagree either about the nature of the threat or about the type of sacrifice they are
prepared to make to meet it,,36
The "Coalition of the Willing" is not a bad way to describe what is needed. We can not
be held hostage to a United Nations that will allow other states to strike others or us with
Weapons of Mass Destruction when this can be prevented by deterrence or preemptive
action. We also need to find the idealistic phraseology to sell it to more of the American
public as well as to world public opinion. We need to get our market share for this
concept up in the 70% range.
36
Ibid., p. 53
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17
We need to have the continual political will and popular support to follow these
guidelines.
10. Or are those wars so different in:
a. circumstance?
b. outcome?
.. ?
c.
Q!}W.
that they yield no useful lessons on how the
u.s.
shou)d deal with foreign policy crises
such as:
I feel that the lessons in section 9 are timeless and allow the United States to adapt to
changing situations.
Deterrence works and is cheaper for all concerned. When you face the undeterrable and
your national interest is at stake, using force sooner instead of as the last resOli, is cheaper
for all concerned.
a. Iraq
Saddam Hussein's Iraq was a danger to us, our allies, the world, and to his people. We
did the right thing. First and foremost, we needed to preempt his ability to turn weapons
of mass destruction over to terrorists. Second, containment was bleeding the Iraqi people
as well as our ability to maintain it. Third, we needed to deprive Saddam the power that
flows from oil. Fourth, his removal from power gives us the opportunity and mission to
build a new Iraq, that will be the "City on the Hill" for the rest of the Arab states as well
as for Iran which will reduce fundamentalist tensions. Fifth, his removal creates a real
opportunity to bring peace to the Mid-East by resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Section 9 is applicable to Iraq.
b. Kosovo
Kosovo was and is a new type of situation that is becoming too familiar in the world
today. "Humanitarian intervention ... to stop 'ethnic cleansing' triggered by the
government of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia.,,3?
"Humanitarian concerns interacting with global communications networks led to pressure
for military intervention in places like Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.,,38
My requirements of Section 9 really do not support our intervention in Kosovo on a
possibly unilateral basis. We wertt into this under NATO, one type of "The Coalition of
the Willing" and were able to bomb Serbia into acceptance ofthe fact that the Serb
government had to stop killing its Albanian citizens.
37
Understanding International Conflicts, An Introduction to Theory and History,
4th
Edition, Joseph S.
Nye, Jr., Longman Classics in Political Science, 2003, pp. 157-158
3&
Ibid., p. 190
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18
The US and Europe had a guilty conscience about the way we had allowed the deaths in
Bosnia a few years earlier and we did not want to see the same thing happening again.
This type of situation needs to be dealt with on a case by case basis. We cannot and
should not be the world's policeman of first resort.
When this situation comes up again, the following questions need to be asked and
answered. We just cannot go hither and yon if it is not in our national interest. The
imperative for a moral intervention will always be present. Our national interest may not.
Two additional McNaull tests would be made as well.
The first is "Is it worth bleeding for?" By this I mean is it worth sending U.S. Armed
forces to die in foreign lands for possibly uncertain reasons. I ask this question because
in the past, my life and those that served under me, could have been those that would be
doing the dying. When you have to write a letter home to parents and spouses, you want
them to be able to know that their loved ones did not die in vain.
Machiavelli provides insight for this in that it is not in the Prince's interest to lose people
for causes that are not in the Prince's national interest.
The Prince does not send people to die for only moral causes and I do not want to either.
As an example, the genocide in Rwanda was morally a cause worth fighting for but it wa
not in our national interest and I am glad that we did not go there to do and die.
The second, and probably more important to me, is "Why do we have to do the killing for
others who do not want to get their hands dirty?"
I find it morally repugnant that other countries in the world expect us to go hither and yon
to areas that are not in our national interest to kill the malefactors so that peace can be
brought to these areas.
If CNN is so concerned with Somalia, Rwanda, and other places, let them or the
neighboring states or the former colonial powers do the killing to bring order to an area.
Those that want peace have to recognize that you have to use force to obtain it and people
will be killed in the process.
Somalia and Rwanda did not meet this test, the recent Kosovo experience was marginal.
III.
1. Were WWI and WWII fought bv the democracies for:
All the wars that I am aware of where democracies have fought have some geopolitical
basis. Kosovo was no exception to the fact that geopolitics and local balance of power
considerations played a role. The Kosovo situation if it continued could have
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19
destabilized Macedonia and possibly caused an Albanian-Serbian warthat could grow, in
addition to completing the genocide being perpetrated on the Albanians living in Serbia.
The European democracies because of their long exposure to balance of power politics
are able to accept the geopolitical aspects of foreign relations more easily and not fret if
they are not embedded in a moral cause.
The same cannot be said for the United Sates.
"Because Americans dislike realpolitik, public discourse about foreign policy in the
United States is usually couched in the language of liberalism. Hence the
pronouncements of the policy elites are heavily flavored with optimism and moralism ....
Behind closed doors, however, the elites who make national security policy speak mostly
the language of power, not that of principle, and the United States acts in the international
system of realist logic. In essence, a discernable gap separates public rhetoric from the
actual conduct of American foreign policy.,,39
a. geopolitical reasons?
Major policy decisions or policies can be a hard sell to the American people if sold only
on a logical basis. Americans like to be emotionally involved when their tax dollars and
possible lives are to be involved.
b. moral reasons?
Americans may be more hypocritical than they like to think they are. In actuality, we are
like the people of other democracies, when major policy decisions or policies are to be
made, we like to know, "What is in it for me?" Here is the rub. They also want to feel
good about these policies and decisions. Members of European democracies are
normally satisfied to know how they will benefit. They do not need to "feel good" about
what is going on but that does not hurt if it can be arranged. Bottom line is that European
democratic leaders have more latitude in what they do because they do not have to sell
the product with the same intensity that may be needed in the United States.
b. or a mixture of both?
Iraq is a perfect and current example of what American leaders face when trying to
implement foreign policy.
It has been our geopolitical interest to remove Saddam Hussein from power since the first
Gulf War. President Clinton recognized the need but could not find a way to "market"
the needed action to the American people. President Bush when he came to office
recognized the need but still could satisfy the "moral" imperative.
September 11, 2001 gave the American people the moral rationale of finally ending the
regime of Saddam Hussein. They know their safety depends on attacking terrorism and
39The
Tragedy of Gn:at Power Politics, John J. Mearsheimer, W. W. Norton
&
Company, 2001, p. 25
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20
those that support it throughout the world, particularly a tyrant who has weapons of mass
destruction who could supply them to terrorists.
2. Do you find Woodrow Wilson's rationale for intervention more compelling?
When you sit back and really think about it, Wilson and our current President Bush are
quite alike in temperament and the way that they are seen by their adversaries, both
were/are considered arrogant, here in the United States as well as overseas.
"The righteousness of America's tone - at times so grating to foreigners - reflected the
reality that America had in fact rebelled not simply against the legal ties that had bound it
to the old country but against Europe's system and values.,,4o
"Woodrow Wilson was the embodiment ofthe tradition of American exceptionalism, and
originated what would become the dominant intellectual school of American foreign
1•
,,41
po
ICY.
Wilson sold a brand of American Ideology. It has motivated us in the past, motivates us
now, and will motivate us in the future. It helped to get us through two world wars.
Some would say that it got us into Vietnam and almost turned the Cold War into WWIII.
"Wilson grasped the mainsprings of American motivation, perhaps the principal one
being that America simply did not see itself as a nation like any other. .,. the American
people's abiding character resides in the practice and propagation of freedom. ,,42
Wilson was able, over time, to prepare the American people to shed their isolation to
become the ultimate balancer in WWI. When the Germans resumed unrestricted
submarine warfare, Wilson was ready. "The world must be made safe for democracy.,,43
3. Do you find Theodore Roosevelt's rationale for intervention more compelling?
Teddy Roosevelt had the better rationale for intervention. In fact, ifhe had been able,
America may have been seen as a potential balancer in Europe and this presence may
have prevented WWI in the first place.
"He was the first president to insist that it was America's duty to make its influence felt
globally, and to relate America to the world in terms of a concept of national interest. ...
Roosevelt was convinced of America's beneficent role in the world.,,44
Roosevelt was the first president to hold the view "that America had real foreign policy
interests that went far beyond its interests in remaining unentangled.,,45
40
Diplomacy, Henry Kissinger, Touchstone, Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 32
41
Ibid., p. 44
42
Ibid., p. 45
43
The World Must be Made Safe for Democracv, Woodrow Wilson, April 2, 1917, Classics of
International Relations,
3fd
Edition, Edited by John A. Vasquez, Prentice Hall, 1986
44
Diplomacy, Henry Kissinger, Touchstone, Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 38
45
Ibid.,
pp.
38-39
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21
"Roosevelt started from the premise that the United States was a power like any other,
not a singular incarnation ofvirhle. Ifits interests collided with those of other cOlmtries,
America had the obligation to draw on its strength to prevail.,,46
Roosevelt did not feel the need to wrap the geopolitical aspects of wanting to participate
more fully in the world's balance of power by wrapping his ideas in American ideology.
"No other president defined America's world role so completely in terms of national
interest, or identified the national interest so comprehensively with the balance of power.
... He did not believe that it (America) could preserve the peace or fulfill its destiny
simply by practicing civic virhles.47
"Roosevelt at first saw no need to engage America in the specifics of the European
balance of power because he considered it more or less self-regulating. But he left little
doubt that if such a judgement were to prove wrong; he would urge America to engage
itselfto re-establish the equilibrium. Roosevelt gradually came to see Germany as a
threat to the European balance and began to identify America's national interest with
those of Great Britain and France.,,48
Roosevelt, had he been President, would have tried to get the United States involved in
WWI at the beginning. On October 3, 1914, he intimated to the British ambassador in
Washington that he would "have acted [against Germany] on the thirtieth or thirty-first of
July',49 [1914].
If Germany had been faced with this warning from the United States, and considered it to
contain both credibility and capability, this might have been the deterrence that would
have prevented WWI.
In early November 1914, Roosevelt commented himself on how he was a lonely prophet
in the wilderness.
"If! should advocate all that I myself believe, I would do no good among our people,
because they would not follow me. Our people are shortsighted, and they do not
understand international matters .... Thanks to the width ofthe ocean, our people believe
that they have nothing to fear from the present contest, and that they have not
responsibility concerning it."sO
Neither America's historical "experience nor its values prepared America for the role
assigned to it by Roosevelt."S!
The sad fact is that Roosevelt's ideas could have either prevented or at least reduced the
cost ofWWI.
46
Ibid., p. 39
47
Ibid., p. 39
48
Ibid., P 41
49
Ibid., p. 43
50
Ibid., p. 43
51
Ibid., p. 43
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22
4. Or do you think that U.S. intervention in both wars reflected a mixture of both?
Roosevelt's ideas on national interest and the balance of power weighed on Wilson and
their reality came increasingly to the fore. It took Wilson 2
Y2
years to fInd the moral
rationale that would provide the way for him to bring the United States into the war on
the side of the Allies.
If the Germans had not resumed umestricted submarine warfare, the Allies might not
have been savable by the time we entered the war if we ever did.
The security of America continues to be threatened to this very day by the fact that the
majority of the American people are not able to think or act based upon the rationality of
geopolitics and balance of power considerations.
If it had not been for September 11, 2001, the dangers that we were facing then would
have continued to grow until we were faced with truly catastrophic attacks from which
we might not have been able to save ourselves.
5. What does your answer suggest about your conclusions generally about the proper
relationship between force in international politics?
The statement that "force should only be used as a last resort" is just a bad maxim to live
by in a dangerous world.
You want to be in a position "to be able to avoid using force as a last resort."
The above assumes that you have capable power and the will to use it to protect your
interests and those of your allies.
If not, your choice to accept with the best grace possible that "the standard of justice
depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have
the power to do and the weak have to accept what they have to accept."S2
Having credible force available to you, being capable of using it, having a predisposition
to use it, projects deterrence with teeth that will deter the deterrable and help you to
vanquish the undeterrable with less cost to all concerned.
6. \Vhat does your answer suggest about your conclusions generally about the proper
relationship between morals in international politics?
A state should be as moral as it can be in all its dealings, both foreign and domestic,
without fatally compromising its national interest.
It may not be entirely "moral" to suspend the right of habeas corpus as Lincoln did, but
preserving the Union really was more important.
52
The Melian Dialogue, Thucydides, 1954Classics oflntemational
Relations.
3rd
Edition, Edited by John
A. Vasquez, Prentice Hall, 1986
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23
It is not moral to allow another country to strike you first when the strike could have been
prevented either by robust deterrence or preemption.
In the interest of geopolitics and the balance of power you may have to associate with
some repugnant regimes and people such as Stalin to obtain the greater immediate good
of defeating Hitler.
Being too absorbed in morality can project the wrong signals to adversaries, which may
make them, think that you are not capable of using the power that you have to maintain
the status quo. America to this day still has a sizable population that gives off the idea
that we will accept and promote peace at any price. This just leads to more death and
destruction.
A flip side of morality issue in the United States, and this may motivate some of the
Peace movement, is that they fear that umestrained American Ideology wrapped in the
American Flag of a rejuvenated Nationalism could lead us in thinking in terms of
spreading our "Manifest Destiny" off shore. It is too bad that the debate could not be
formed along these lines.
Bottom line is that a state should do what it has to do to survive within limits. Should we
become like Nazi Germany to survive? No. Should we possibly curtail our expanded
civil liberties and use preemption to survive? Yes.
7. Who looks better to you now?
I stand with Machiavelli because he is easier for me to understand and relate to. I also
think that he provides you with a description of the world as it is. This recognition
should help you to survive and possibly make the world a little better for your efforts
while you are traveling through it.
a. Gandhi?
Gandhi is a widely revered leader whose nonviolent resistance program worked against
the British to achieve Indian independence but it could not be sold to the people of
colonial India who were made independent by its application. The result being the
division of colonial India into three states, with great loss of life, and that still has the
cancer of Kashmir festering in its midst.
You can say that for the right cause, nonviolent resistance can address wrongs being
committed by particular adversaries. lfthe convergence of circumstances is favorable
and the aggrieved party has the commitment to pay the price of civil disobedience and
has the patience and time for the wrongs to be resolved in the aggrieved party's favor it is
both fiendishly clever and it will work.
In the case of India, the British people were the target. They are a people of conscience
whose history included ending to the most part, slavery in the world.
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24
Their conscience told them that India deserved to be independent. Their laws also
allowed for people and organizations to seek redress from them through the political
process.
Gandhi for the most part was able to get his followers to pay the price through this long
process as he did, by continually reminding the British that they were wrong and that they
could do better.
The pricked British conscience eventually agreed with Gandhi and India became
independent.
Gandhi's approach has no chance of success directly against total Machiavellians.
b. Aquinas?
Aquinas provides an excellent lens to review and further test a Machiavellian analysis
that suggests whether force is used or not.
Neither Aquinas nor the church prohibited the use of force in self-defense. "A just war is
usually described as one that avenges wrongs (fights an aggressor state), when a nation or
state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends (allowing terrorists safe haven) for
the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what has been seized unjustly.,,53
Aquinas does not come down either against a preemptive war. "A just cause is required,
namely that those who are attacked should be attacked because they deserve in on
account of some fault. ,,54 In fact, if you dwell on this point, you reach the conclusion that
the "justness" of a war is decided on the eye of the beholder, which is very
Machiavellian.
The "justness of a war" boils down to the third precept, the war should be made by the
initiator (is not this preemption at its very core) should "have a right intention, so that
they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evi1."ss
Taken literally, a state that has the power and the will would become the world's
policeman righting the wrongs of the world on a continual basis, until perfection was
achieved on this earth.
In the real world, the Machiavellian who uses preemptive force against an adversary will
have the proper Aquinas spin control/advertising in place to mask the action in idealism
and moral purpose. All wars are preemptive in the fact that there is an initiator who
chooses the war option first, although this is not currently recognized.
c. Machiavelli?
5353
Of War, Thomas Aquinas, Classics ofIntemational
Relations,
3rd
Edition, Edited by John A. Vasquez,
Prentice Hall, 1986, p. 33
4
Ibid., p. 33
55
Ib'd
3"
1 .,
p. .;)
________________________________________
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25
Machiavelli's Prince is the book that you need to read and absorb internally so you can be
prepared to deal with the world at its worst. This does not mean that you have to agree
with Machiavelli. It does mean that you have to use his system of analysis in terms ofthe
state system that you are in, the nature of your regime and the regimes of the other
contending states, your own nature, and the nature of the leaders in the contending states.
Machiavelli requires you to know and respect history. The Prince then has to decide on
how and if the "lessons of history" can be applied to situations that confront the state
today. Some lessons of the past may be useful while others may spell disaster. This is
why the job of the Prince is so difficult.
The Prince also has to remember every hour that other Princes have his book and are
reading it as well.
Machiavelli might be momentarily disappointed by the current French attempt to hijack
both the EU and the UN. He would not be surprised because the worst aspects of human
nature are played out in the International Arena.
"It could easily be shown how many treaties of peace, and how many engagements, have
been made null and void by the faithlessness of princes (France and Germany); and he
who has best known how to play the fox has ever been the most successful."s6
The paradox and challenge of the Machiavellian approach and analysis is that if the
Prince is a President operating in a free and open society, especially in the United States,
his conclusions have to be presented in a fashion that appeals to the moral idealism of the
American public. Americans, as a majority, do not respond well to unvarnished
realpolitik.
The President found selling "freeing the people of Iraq from a tyrant who will inevitably
supply weapons of mass destruction to terrorists for use against the United States" was
easier to sell to the American public than saying it is our geopolitical and balance of
power interest to be in a position to settle the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
d. or a synthetic paradigm that derives elements from them all without acceptin?: anv of
them completely?
Each situation is different. Each outcome is different. Time and lack of complete
information always works against you.
This is why it is so important that your education in terms of history and great thinkers of
the past as well as those of the present are imbedded deeply in your subconscious. This
enables you to do your best. It also helps to show critics that you have considered their
version of history and have found that it does not apply to the situation at hand as well as
your course of action.
56
From The Prince, Niccol0 Machiavelli, 1513,Classics ofIntern.ational Relations.
3'd
Edition, Edited by
John A. Vasquez, Prentice Hall, 1986, p. 18
________________________________________
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26
Statesmen have to act in the now using the information that they have. They do not have
the luxury of 20/20 hindsight. They can assess the probabilities of success in terms of
what they are facing and proceed. Success will be known as foresight.
I admire the idealism of Gandhi and would try to get my decisions to take on some of this
aura if possible. If not, not.
I would like to think that my actions in using force, and I am disposed to using force
when threatened sooner instead oflater, would meet Aquinas's requirements, particularly
the third, "We go to war that we may have peace.
,,57
This would also help to satisfy
American Public Opinion. In fact we have gone to war to "Make the world safe for
democracy" and to "A war to end all wars" in the past.
We have to secure the peace in Iraq. A go/no go decision considering North Korea is
needed by this summer if we wish to make a proactive decision. No action by us will
leave us with the decision made by North Korea.
In my heart of hearts, I am a Machiavellian with a conscience. He gives you the points
that you need to check off and the dangers to watch for. He wants the state to survive. I
would play to the crowd to make them as happy as possible but I would also do what
needs to be done to preserve the nation and use almost all means available to achieve this
end. Would I use nuclear weapons, neutron bombs preferably? Yes. Would I use poison
gas? No. Would I use biological agents? No.
I would also like to add the McNaull corollary to the Lombardi maxim of "Winning is the
only thing." namely, "A bad win is always better than a good loss." Even if we lose the
peace in Iraq due to the lack of American will and staying power, I still think that we will
be better off than to have left the ticking time bomb of Saddam in power.
57
Ibid., p. 33
________________________________________
Page 31
a
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Top Strategy Topics to Understand Geo-Strategy News, International Security Events, Global Politics Analysis, Global Trends and Forecasting, Economic Development and Reconstruction, Energy and Climate Change, Global Health and Human Rights. Tags: News, strategy, topics, security, geopolitical, strategies, economies, war, military, armed, economic development, international relations, history, geography, environment, NGO, alliances, European Union, flags, USA, United State of America, international relations, history, geography, environment, NGO, alliances, European Union, flags, USA, United State of America
President's Remarks at the United Nations, George W. Bush, September 12,2002,
www.whitehouse.gov/news/re1eases/2002/09/print/20020912-1.htm1
The New York Times
The Burlington Free Press
The Washington Post
