The Hegemonic Stability theory, Hegemonic War strategies and the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, an assessment.
In order to assess the HST and its explanatory power regarding the Clinton and George W. Bush
administration, this essay is split into three main parts.
First, there will be an examination of the HST. The theory’s strengths and weaknesses will be
explored with including the phenomena of the hegemonic war strategies as argued by Gilpin. Moreover, the
argument is made that the U.S. is a hegemon.
Second, this paper will argue that the U.S. under the Clinton administration showed classical features
of a hegemon in decline. This argument will concentrate on foreign relations, economic strategies performance
and the own goals set by the Clinton administration.
Third, the state action and policies of the GWB administration will be examined under the
presumption that the U.S. is in decline and in a state of hegemonic war. The congruence between the
U.S. policies and the HST will be in focus of this part of the argument.
administration, this essay is split into three main parts.
First, there will be an examination of the HST. The theory’s strengths and weaknesses will be
explored with including the phenomena of the hegemonic war strategies as argued by Gilpin. Moreover, the
argument is made that the U.S. is a hegemon.
Second, this paper will argue that the U.S. under the Clinton administration showed classical features
of a hegemon in decline. This argument will concentrate on foreign relations, economic strategies performance
and the own goals set by the Clinton administration.
Third, the state action and policies of the GWB administration will be examined under the
presumption that the U.S. is in decline and in a state of hegemonic war. The congruence between the
U.S. policies and the HST will be in focus of this part of the argument.
The Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) is among the most influential and most discussed theories in
international relations. It claims to predict the political strategies future of the United States of America and the
political strategies past of the world. First developed for the economic strategies realm by Charles P. Kindleberger, it
became very influential and widely known when it was stretched into the study of International
relations by Gilpin. However, can the theory explain the behavior of the United States under Bill
Clinton and Georg W. Bush?
In order to assess the HST and its explanatory power regarding the Clinton and George W. Bush
administration, this essay is split into three main parts.
First, there will be an examination of the HST. The theory’s strengths and weaknesses will be
explored with including the phenomena of the hegemonic war strategies as argued by Gilpin. Moreover, the
argument is made that the U.S. is a hegemon.
Second, this paper will argue that the U.S. under the Clinton administration showed classical features
of a hegemon in decline. This argument will concentrate on foreign relations, economic strategies performance
and the own goals set by the Clinton administration.
Third, the state action and policies of the GWB administration will be examined under the
presumption that the U.S. is in decline and in a state of hegemonic war. The congruence between the
U.S. policies and the HST will be in focus of this part of the argument.
This work aims to demonstrate that, regardless of the weaknesses of the HST, the U.S. may be
considered hegemon being in a state of decline in which the GWB administration rages a hegemonic
war strategies to sustain U.S. power. As controversial as this argument is, the HST can explain the behavior of
the two presidencies and their policies.
HST, war strategies and the U.S.
First of all, the HST needs to be assessed and certain key terms need to be defined.
There has been a substantial debate about the definition of the hegemon inside the HST. There exist
three different definitions of the term ‘hegemon’ in the argumentations surrounding the HST.
The first definition states, that a hegemon is a positive, a leader of a group of states which
encourages, cooperates and sacrifices him for the common good (Agnew strategies 2005: 22). The presence or
absence of this hegemon only partially answers why order and stability have prevailed at some times
in the international economic strategies system and disorder and instability at others, which can be explained
by voluntary cooperation of other actors (Strange 1987: 553-554). This might be regarded as a liberal
definition.
The second definition states, that a hegemon is negative and evil, an exploitive suppressive power
which just cooperates with the other in order to gain (Agnew strategies 2005: 22). This “(...) hegemon will
produce order and stability in the world and, more specifically, order and stability in an
interdependent world economy when it uses its power to enforce order on others and stability in the
world-and, more specifically, order and stability in an interdependent world economy-when it uses
its power to enforce order on others” (Strange 1987: 553-554). This definition fits the neorealist
approach, wherein the state cooperates out of own interest.
The third definition is given by Agnew:
“(...) hegemony is the enrolment of others in the exercise of your power by convincing, cajoling, and
coercing them that they should want what you want. Though never complete and often resisted, it
represents the binding together of people, objects, and institutions around cultural norms and
standards that emanate over time and space from seats of power (that have discrete locations)
occupied by authoritative states” (Agnew strategies 2005: 1-2).
This work argues that a hegemon is defined by a combination of the three definitions above: the first
and the second definitions can be characterized as tactics or forms of interactions between the
hegemon and other states. These interactions are also related to cultural norms and standards the
interacting states are based on. Therefore, a united definition of the three definitions given above
can be regarded as most useful in the future argument surrounding the U.S. hegemony and the
hegemons power.
It is widely disputed what effectively constitutes hegemonic power. Agnew strategies for instance argues that
hegemonic power is purely soft power (Agnew strategies 2005: 22). The argument of Strange is that hegemonic
power is structural power which might be defined as “the power to choose and to shape the
structures of the global political strategies economy within which other states, their political strategies institutions, their
economic strategies enterprises, and (not least) their professional people have to operate”(Strange 1987: 565).
Furthermore, it can be argued that hegemonic power is purely economic, political strategies and cultural.
Consequently, hegemonic power ought to be defined as a structural power which is sustained by a
network of economic, political strategies and cultural cooperation and dominated by the hegemon.
After a definition of hegemony and hegemonic power is established, the HST can be examined.
The HST is based on the assumption that “the presence of a dominant actor will lead to the provision
of a stable international regime of free trade (more broadly, hegemons provide leadership for the
emergence of international regimes in various issue-areas). (...) although the dominant leader
benefits from this situation (i.e., it turns a net "profit" from providing the good), smaller states gain
even more” (Snidal 1985: 581). This means that the balance of power is just possible when a
hegemon upholds and supports the international economic strategies and political strategies system.
Gilpin gives a definition of the HST wherein a hegemon extends until equilibrium is reached between
the cost and benefits of further change and expansion. This results in a tendency for the economic
cost of maintaining the international status quo to rise faster than the financial capacity of the
dominant power to support it position and the status quo. In order to maintain its dominant position,
a state must increases its expenditure on military forces, the financing of allies, foreign aid, a
constant economic strategies growth and the costs associated with maintaining the international economy.
However, once equilibrium between the costs and benefits of expansion is reached, the costs of
maintaining the status quo tend to increase more than the capacity to finance the status quo. As a
result, the international system enters a state of disequilibrium. The consequence of continuing a
state of disequilibrium and financial problems is the eventual economic strategies and political strategies decline of the
hegemon (Gilpin 1981: 156-158).
When the hegemon is in a state of decline, certain features appear which this paper will use to
produce the argument that the U.S. is a hegemon in decline.
In a hegemonic state the national income is divided into three sectors: protection of the state,
consumption (welfare ...), and productive reinvestment (schools, universities ...). If the hegemon
declines, the protection and consumption sector tends to receive most of the financial resources that
the economy and the civil society erodes due to cut backs in the sector of productive reinvestment
(Gilpin 1981: 158). If the growth in private and public consumption is greater than the gross national
product, a psychological shift appears inside the society which further undercuts the economic
performance. Moreover internal changes become manifest in the allocation of national income
among protectionism, consumption and investment (Gilpin 1981: 163-166). The amount of free
riding states that benefits from the public goods provided will cost the hegemon more then it
benefits from the cooperation. These costs outweigh the costs the hegemon has by providing ‘public
goods’ which maintain the status quo.
According to Gilpin this gives the hegemon two options: on the one hand “the challenged power can
seek to increase the resources devoted to maintaining its commitments and position in the
international system”, on the other hand “it can attempt to reduce its existing commitments (and
associated costs) in a way that does not ultimately jeopardize its international position” (Gilpin 1981:
188). There is, however, an additional phenomenon occurring in extreme stages of decline, namely
the hegemonic war.
The latter is a war strategies which is raged against the direct or indirect contestants of the hegemon. The
fundamental dispute is over the nature and governance of the system. The condition preceding a
hegemonic war strategies is the perception that a fundamental historic change is taking place. A further
condition is the perception that the course of events begins to escape human control (Gilpin 1981:
199-202).
This form of warfare is an effect of a hegemon in decline which also has additional features as argued
by Gilpin: One reaction of a hegemon in decline might be the launch of a preventive war strategies or the state
may seek to reduce the cost of maintaining its position by means of further expansion (turbulent
frontier thesis). In effect, the state hopes to reduce long term-costs by acquiring less costly defensive
positions. The last feature of brining cost and resources into balance is, of course, to reduce foreign
commitments (Gilpin 1981: 191-192). However, there are many critics which regard the HST as
incorrect.
Since its existence and growing popularity, the theory has been met with criticism. One of the major
critics of this theory is Duncan Snidal. He argues that “the absence of a hegemon is associated with
disorder in the world system and undesirable outcomes for individual states”, whereas “graphical
analysis and a numerical example show that cooperation of multiple states while a hegemon declines
not only can be sustained in the face of declining hegemony, it may even be enhanced” (Snidal 1985:
579-580). Furthermore, he criticises that Gilpin did neither limit nor define the power of a hegemon
which leads to the problem that the HST cannot be falsified (Snidal 1985: 587). In addition, he
criticises that, following the HST argument, collective action is impossible especially if this action
would affect the balance of power in favour of the small, disadvantaged states and consequently
against the hegemon (Snidal 1985: 593, 613).
Another critic is Grunberg who states:
“In the modern world, the emergence of a world market economy was dependent on the pluralistic
structure of the European (and subsequently the global) political strategies system. . . . [The] failure of the
several efforts to unify Europe politically permitted the expansion of a market-type economy. The
absence of an imperial power to organize and control production and exchange gave free rein to
market forces“(Grunberg 1990: 436).
He also mentions that, through certain events, small states might grow substantially quicker than a
hegemon in economic strategies terms. Moreover, he states that a hegemon will not try to sustain the status
quo when the short term profits are very small compared to the long term negative effects
(Grunberg 1990: 441). Grunberg disputes that public goods distributed through the hegemon are
really free since they might be limited or denied and that the HST sometimes appears to be
ethnocentrically favouring the U.S. (Grunberg 1990: 442, 447).
All this criticism is taken into account while the argument is established that the U.S. is in fact a
hegemon according to the definition of this paper.
The U.S. a hegemon
The U.S. hegemony is a not widely disputed fact in political strategies science. Agnew strategies argues that “the main
thrust of contemporary world politics is the result of the particular hegemony exercised by American
society in the rest of the world through the agency of both the U.S. government and a wide range of
other institutions, cooperate, philanthropic, and inter-governmental – whose basic structures and
norms are those of the marketplace society that developed in the United States in the nineteenth
and twentieth century” (Agnew strategies 2005: 1). An example for the U.S. hegemony is given by Grunberg:
(...) When the United States exerted pressures to keep Brazil's hardware market open, its behaviour
was considered typical of a declining hegemon (Grunberg 1990: 438). The current hegemony comes
to a rising price for the United States.
The international community does not share all of the military and administrative costs (e.g. Gulf
War strategies 1991). Furthermore, the international community expects the hegemon to take preventive or
pre-emptive action for their common good. Supplementary, the institutional basis for contemporary
economic strategies and political strategies super governmental organisations were largely under American auspices
(Agnew strategies 2005: 31-32).
Additional examples would be the proxy wars during the cold war strategies period, the influence in the
development of foreign states and the global economic strategies system, the military spending, the amount of
international aid, the influence on global culture and science and finally the per head calorie
consumption.
The HST and the Clinton era
Many argue that the economy in the U.S. undergoes its economic strategies climax (Gilpin 1981: 160). This is a
phenomenon which every service based economy has to deal with. This is based on the predicted
shift of the unequal economic strategies state budget distribution between protection, consumption and
investment (Gilpin 1981: 166). Moreover, there is a big dependency on foreign capital (Gilpin 1981:
17). This downfall of the economy was something Bill Clinton had to deal with. He assumed office
faced with a huge budget deficit which he tried to overcome by raising taxes, blunting the Republican
drive to cut the budget and protecting the spending priorities. In the face of a looming budgetary
surplus, he introduced the link between that surplus and funding future shortfalls in middle-class
entitlement programs (Peri 2000: 37). This budget deficit was something Bill Clinton could not
overcome. In fact, the income inequality which had begun during the years of the Reagan
administration accelerated during the Clinton administration (Tatalovich & Frendreis 2000: 55). He
was aware of this problem and tried to tackle it by establishing the National Economic strategies Council (NEC)
which coordinated the economic strategies policy making (Tatalovich & Frendreis 2000: 45). Unfortunately,
these measures did not prove successful in halting the economic strategies decline.
This was also due to Clinton’s lack of experience in foreign policy during the first term (Peri 2000: 32).
At the beginning of the Clinton era, a lack of direction in the international policy of the U.S. was
visible. Two fundamental points guided Clinton’s foreign policy: on the one hand, establishing liberal
democracies and on the other hand, the creation of free market societies (McCormick 2000: 60). The
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) were leftovers of the Bush administration. The ratification process of GATT can be seen as a
further example for the still powerful hegemonic status of the U.S. despite its decline. The House and
the Senate voted for GATT by a big bipartisan majority because of the existence of a trigger
mechanism allowing congress to vote to withdraw from GATT if the United States was subjected to
unfair rulings by the Court of International trade (Tatalovich & Frendreis 2000: 49).
An example for the economic strategies decline of the U.S. might be seen when examining the foreign policy of
Clinton regarding China. At first Clinton did not want to cooperate with the Chinese in the economic
sphere because of their poor human rights records, but then did he changed his mind because the
economic strategies advantage was crucial for sustaining U.S. hegemony (Peri 2000: 33).
Another action which can be regarded as a move to sustain the U.S. hegemony was the withdrawal
from international obligations. “Instead of decisive action in Bosnia as Clinton had promised, within
several month of taking office Secretary of State Christopher rejected the possibility of the United
States stopping ethnic killing” (Peri 2000: 33). This can be evaluated as a move of a hegemon which
tries to sustain its power by withdrawing from commitments abroad. The example of Kosovo would
further sustain this argument. Clinton acted out of a moral imperative to help the people in Kosovo,
but he also justified his action as an effort to defend the U.S. national interest by presenting the
further expansion of the conflict(McCormick 2000: 60). The reason for the intervention was that the
short term costs were lower than the cost in a worst-case scenario would have been. In the second
term however, Clinton pursued a more elaborate foreign policy. Clinton “committed the United
States to global engagement and leadership, he also indicated that America would pursue
cooperative ties with other powerful nations, seek to adapt and build sound economic strategies and security
institutions in the international community, and support democracy and human rights” (McCormick
2000: 65). This statement shows that the U.S. was promoting itself as a hegemon in a positive sense
where the U.S. was the leading power which would unite enemies.
”The United States was committed to a global role; it would act unilaterally or multilaterally,
depending on the circumstances, to achieve its goals; and it would use American force if necessary”
(McCormick 2000: 64). This new strategies agenda was more aggressive and more coordinated to promote a
U.S. interest. Seeing the goals set, it might come as a surprise that Clinton’s main policy making was
not directed at foreign policy but at domestic issues (Tatalovich & Frendreis 2000: 46). The
Millennium Goals are further prove of a more ambitious and elaborate security foreign policy. The
goal was to build a future in which the people will be safe from proliferation, terrorism, drugs and
the effects of climate change (McCormick 2000: 66). This goal helped Clinton to justify a reformation
of the military which will aid the future reformation by Rumsfeld. The Clinton administration wanted
to improve the quality of the forces and save money at the same time. “The Clinton administration’s
Bottom-up Review outlined the kind of new strategies military that it sought – a military that was smaller, more
mobile, and more capable of new strategies missions for the changing threat environment” (Tatalovich &
Frendreis 2000: 61).
This highlights another aspect of the hegemonic decline which is that the American military has
increasingly become a force composed of the less educated and the unskilled. Consequently, the
costs for the military tend to grow disproportionally whereas the quality of the military declines
(Gilpin 1981: 163). This reform aimed at one of the fundamental problems of the hegemonic decline
which is the imbalance between the cost benefit of state organs.
Furthermore, the Clinton administration’s enlarged Somalia mission which included a nation building
goals failed in 1993. The Somalia experience paralyzed the administration; therefore it did very little
when Rwanda erupted in genocide in 1994 (McCormick 2000: 67-68). This inefficiency is best
summarized by Miller: “Citing the lack of a convincing world view, poorly articulated goals and
ineffectual means, plus a confusing agenda in Europe, many observers have essentially deemed the
Clinton years a failure in foreign policy terms” (Miller 1994: 634). These mostly empty foreign
promises combined with the failure to act as a decisive leader of the world community hints towards
the policy of a declining hegemon which prefers to save resources. Even the economic strategies goals of GATT
and NAFTA took enormous time and energy to take off (Miller 1994: 624).
This administration managed to foster national unity through foreign defeat (Miller 1994: 634). This
polarization together with the growing state debt, the withdrawal from foreign commitments, the
commitment to small government and the declining control over allies can be seen as indicators for a
declining hegemon.
Hegemonic war strategies and the GWB administration
A new strategies foreign policy era began with GWB. Before 9/11, “Bush singled out three threats requiring
particular attention: Russia, China, and rouge countries, such as Iraq and North Korea” (Dietrich
2005: 16). Despite his claims that the U.S. would fight injustice he did nothing against the killings in
East Timor (Chomsky 2003: 53). It seems to be quite a common feature of the GWB foreign policy to
pay less attention towards issues concerning human rights than to matters which direct or indirectly
affect U.S. interest.
An example sustaining that claim is that in his election campaign, GWB merely made passing
references to problems like global poverty, the spread of diseases such as AIDS and environmental
issues (Dietrich 2005: 14). “Most dramatically, in sharp contrast to both liberal internationalist and
neo-conservative views, Bush argued that the United States should not use its military for purely
humanitarian missions and nation building” (Dietrich 2005: 16). These pre 9/11 policies and speeches
clearly indicate that U.S. policy under GWB can be described as conservative and neo realistic. As
early as in 1999 he defined the fight against terrorism as his foreign policy goal (Dietrich 2005: 24).
This goal seemed to be as unrealistic in 1999 as it was 2001 because of the following reason. “(...) it is
not clear that the United States can economically afford to prosecute a war strategies without end on terrorism
or its perceived cultural and political strategies opponents without the active cooperation of its previous allies
and without sacrificing the very values and interests that it was is supposedly all about”(Agnew strategies 2005:
27). This economic strategies aspect regarding the plan to play a bigger role in foreign policy are not
financeable because of three reasons: First, because of the growing dependency on foreign goods
and second, because of the lack of a foreign threat which could bring the U.S. and its allies closer
together (Agnew strategies 2005: 29-30). Finally, the U.S. has seen the return of the ‘twin deficits’ problem:
massive government overspending to pay for a growing military, plus increased demands for tax cuts
for the rich which increases the dependency of the local economy on foreign credits and thus
increases the trade and account deficit (Agnew strategies 2005: 228). 9/11 exacerbated this grave economic
situation. The disequilibrium between protection, consumption and investment was now totally out
of control. There was also a big break between the GWB administration and international
organisations.
The attitude of the administration towards the United Nation is best summarized by the U.S.
ambassador for the UN, John Bolton: “There is no such thing as the United Nations. There is an
international community that can be led by the only real power left in the world, and that is the
United States, when it suits our interest and when we can get others to go along” (Callinicos 2003:
76). This statement underlines the argument of critics of the HST and those critics who doubt that
the U.S. power is declining. Strange would argue that this style of foreign policy shows that the
structural power of the U.S. actually increased and that collective action is actually possible but only
with the U.S., not against it (Strange 1987: 557, 574). This seems to be a clear cut between the
international community and the U.S. which is also demonstrated by Chomsky:
“The proof that the system (UN) is hot air is straightforward: Washington made it clear that it intends
to do all it can to maintain its pre-eminence, then announced that it would ignore the UN security
council over Iraq and declared more broadly that it would no longer be bound by the UN Charter’s
rules governing the use of force” (Chomsky 2003: 13).
Further examples include the U.S. boycotting talks regarding the demilitarization of space (Chomsky
2003: 232). Moreover, one should mention the break with the Kyoto protocol on global warming, the
denunciation of the treaty establishing an international criminal court, the resignation from the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty and the disregard for UN institutions (Callinicos 2003: 17). These are policies
can be evaluated as policy of a realist. Moreover, all those actions can be justified under the premise
that a fundamental historical change is taking place and that the course of events begins to escape
human control. These hegemonic policies combined with 9/11 brought a new strategies dawn for the American
people. In addition, following the definition given by Gilpin, these policies are the features of a
hegemonic war strategies which is fought under the perception that there is a threat to fundamental values.
GWB demonstrated that this is an exceptional time where in a war strategies is fought between the
fundamental forces of good against the evil in the world (Whitehouse 2003). This clearly shows that
“the post-September 11, 2001, tendency of the Bush administration toward an increasingly brazen
imperial strategy, taking off from its systematic attempts at disabling a number of international in
activities (...) is undoubtedly the fruit of a new strategies ideological commitment to empire rather than to
other means of securing hegemony” (Agnew strategies 2005: 35). This tendency to polarize through a new
foreign policy was further reflected through the invasion in Iraq. The invasion of Iraq was a further
indicator for a hegemonic war.
Also, there was “a burst of measures to protect domestic manufacturing industries and agribusiness,
and retreat from many types of multilateral commitment are indicative of the U.S. government’s
reactions to perceived military and economic strategies threats”(Agnew strategies 2005:224). This war strategies is raged to protect
US domestic economic strategies interest. The connection between the administration and parts of the U.S.
economy which is directly profit from the war, is not a coincident. “A good example (...) is provided
by the current US Vice President, Dick Cheney, who still receives deferred compensation with up to 1
million dollar a year from Halliburton, the oil company that he used to head and that was one of the
six big American corporations invited secretly to bid for work to reconstruct Iraq (…)”(Callinicos 2003:
31-32). Another aspect of the Iraq war strategies which underlines hegemonic interests are the resources and
markets which are now open to the U.S. Nonetheless, this hegemonic war strategies has extreme implications
for the U.S. foreign policy and domestic affairs.
Agnew strategies argues that the war strategies on terror put the U.S. government at odds with many other governments
including many of its nominal allies in NATO, with international organisations and with itself ,
domestically , having passed the Patriot act and other anti-subversive legislation. Furthermore, the
war strategies showed “(...) the lack of support by other governments for the U.S. invasion of Iraq which
suggests a significant erosion of U.S. legitimacy” (Agnew strategies 2005: 19, 225). This erosion did not just
affect foreign policy but also Americans civil society as anybody can be a enemy combatant or a
suspected terrorists and be imprisoned without charges or access to lawyers or family until the
White House determines that its war strategies on terror has been successfully concluded; that is, indefinitely
(Chomsky 2003: 26). GWB showed the citizens and the world that the hegemon is at war strategies and there is
just one decision to be made by everybody: "You're either with us or against us in the fight against
terror” (CNN 2001). Supplementary, “Cheney-Rumsfeld-Powell and their associates are officially
declaring an even more extreme policy, one aimed at permanent global hegemony by reliance on
force if necessary” (Chomsky 2003: 16). This policy shows that the GWB administration clearly
pictures the war strategies on terror as a fundamental war strategies for the values and the status quo of the world order.
Critics who disagree that the U.S. is a declining hegemon assert that the U.S. is a country with elite
universities and has a very strong currency. Moreover, they claim that half of the top 300 companies
are in the U.S. and that, most importantly, the U.S. has the most powerful military in the world
(Strange 1987: 567-570). All these arguments can be neglected when looking at the role the U.S. is
playing in contemporary international politics.
Conclusion
The HST is widely disputed and can be regarded as a realist world view which is naturally challenged
by liberalists and neo Marxists. This paper states that, despite most criticism, the U.S. is even
considered a hegemon by critics of the HST.
The HST states that a hegemon is in decline when the costs for maintaining the status quo outweigh
the benefits. Furthermore, disequilibrium in the state expenditure appears which the hegemon
endeavours to balance by withdrawing from foreign commitments.
These indicators could be observed during the Clinton administration. Clinton tried to balance the
budget by cutbacks inside the government. Moreover, he attempted to widen international
cooperation and by doing so, reduce U.S. commitment abroad. This policy can still be regarded as
hegemonic since a hegemon might use cooperation tactics in order to minimize costs. The
disequilibrium in the state budget could not be balanced as the amount of spending for defence and
commodities was much higher than the amount paid for reinvestment.
The failure to respond efficiently in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Rwanda combined with a clear
disconnect between the goals, which were set rhetorically but were followed by insufficient actions,
led to the conclusion that the U.S. is incapable of fulfilling its task as a hegemon. Therefore, it can be
argued that the U.S. is a declining hegemon.
The era of GWB clearly showed the strong ambitions to restore hegemony but also a polarized
society which is fearful of the economic strategies decline and the threat of terrorism. The terror attack of 9/11
gave the GWB administration the momentum to enact a hegemonic war strategies which enabled the
government to tighten its control over the economy, its allies and foreign resources. Furthermore, it
can be argued that the ‘War strategies on Terror’ is in fact a tool the administration uses to justify its aggressive
tactics with the goal to regain the hegemonic power lost. However, this goal will not be reached due
to the economic strategies and foreign relations problems which the administration encounters.
Clearly, a different approach in evaluating the administrations’ policies is possible. Nevertheless, the
evaluation of the two administrations using the HST can be regarded as logical and neo realistic.
In conclusion, the HST cannot be completely assessed because of the limited frame set in this essay.
The two administrations clearly show indications of a hegemon in decline which were analysed by
Gilpin. Unfortunately is it impossible to measure the rate of the decline due to the fact that
hegemonic power is not measurable. Moreover, the match between the HST and the politics of the
two administrations can be a historical coincident. Finally, the GWB administration is still in power
and a final evaluation of their policy in respect to the historical implications is therefore impossible.
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international relations. It claims to predict the political strategies future of the United States of America and the
political strategies past of the world. First developed for the economic strategies realm by Charles P. Kindleberger, it
became very influential and widely known when it was stretched into the study of International
relations by Gilpin. However, can the theory explain the behavior of the United States under Bill
Clinton and Georg W. Bush?
In order to assess the HST and its explanatory power regarding the Clinton and George W. Bush
administration, this essay is split into three main parts.
First, there will be an examination of the HST. The theory’s strengths and weaknesses will be
explored with including the phenomena of the hegemonic war strategies as argued by Gilpin. Moreover, the
argument is made that the U.S. is a hegemon.
Second, this paper will argue that the U.S. under the Clinton administration showed classical features
of a hegemon in decline. This argument will concentrate on foreign relations, economic strategies performance
and the own goals set by the Clinton administration.
Third, the state action and policies of the GWB administration will be examined under the
presumption that the U.S. is in decline and in a state of hegemonic war. The congruence between the
U.S. policies and the HST will be in focus of this part of the argument.
This work aims to demonstrate that, regardless of the weaknesses of the HST, the U.S. may be
considered hegemon being in a state of decline in which the GWB administration rages a hegemonic
war strategies to sustain U.S. power. As controversial as this argument is, the HST can explain the behavior of
the two presidencies and their policies.
HST, war strategies and the U.S.
First of all, the HST needs to be assessed and certain key terms need to be defined.
There has been a substantial debate about the definition of the hegemon inside the HST. There exist
three different definitions of the term ‘hegemon’ in the argumentations surrounding the HST.
The first definition states, that a hegemon is a positive, a leader of a group of states which
encourages, cooperates and sacrifices him for the common good (Agnew strategies 2005: 22). The presence or
absence of this hegemon only partially answers why order and stability have prevailed at some times
in the international economic strategies system and disorder and instability at others, which can be explained
by voluntary cooperation of other actors (Strange 1987: 553-554). This might be regarded as a liberal
definition.
The second definition states, that a hegemon is negative and evil, an exploitive suppressive power
which just cooperates with the other in order to gain (Agnew strategies 2005: 22). This “(...) hegemon will
produce order and stability in the world and, more specifically, order and stability in an
interdependent world economy when it uses its power to enforce order on others and stability in the
world-and, more specifically, order and stability in an interdependent world economy-when it uses
its power to enforce order on others” (Strange 1987: 553-554). This definition fits the neorealist
approach, wherein the state cooperates out of own interest.
 |
| Hegemonic Stability Theory |
The third definition is given by Agnew:
“(...) hegemony is the enrolment of others in the exercise of your power by convincing, cajoling, and
coercing them that they should want what you want. Though never complete and often resisted, it
represents the binding together of people, objects, and institutions around cultural norms and
standards that emanate over time and space from seats of power (that have discrete locations)
occupied by authoritative states” (Agnew strategies 2005: 1-2).
This work argues that a hegemon is defined by a combination of the three definitions above: the first
and the second definitions can be characterized as tactics or forms of interactions between the
hegemon and other states. These interactions are also related to cultural norms and standards the
interacting states are based on. Therefore, a united definition of the three definitions given above
can be regarded as most useful in the future argument surrounding the U.S. hegemony and the
hegemons power.
It is widely disputed what effectively constitutes hegemonic power. Agnew strategies for instance argues that
hegemonic power is purely soft power (Agnew strategies 2005: 22). The argument of Strange is that hegemonic
power is structural power which might be defined as “the power to choose and to shape the
structures of the global political strategies economy within which other states, their political strategies institutions, their
economic strategies enterprises, and (not least) their professional people have to operate”(Strange 1987: 565).
Furthermore, it can be argued that hegemonic power is purely economic, political strategies and cultural.
Consequently, hegemonic power ought to be defined as a structural power which is sustained by a
network of economic, political strategies and cultural cooperation and dominated by the hegemon.
After a definition of hegemony and hegemonic power is established, the HST can be examined.
The HST is based on the assumption that “the presence of a dominant actor will lead to the provision
of a stable international regime of free trade (more broadly, hegemons provide leadership for the
emergence of international regimes in various issue-areas). (...) although the dominant leader
benefits from this situation (i.e., it turns a net "profit" from providing the good), smaller states gain
even more” (Snidal 1985: 581). This means that the balance of power is just possible when a
hegemon upholds and supports the international economic strategies and political strategies system.
Gilpin gives a definition of the HST wherein a hegemon extends until equilibrium is reached between
the cost and benefits of further change and expansion. This results in a tendency for the economic
cost of maintaining the international status quo to rise faster than the financial capacity of the
dominant power to support it position and the status quo. In order to maintain its dominant position,
a state must increases its expenditure on military forces, the financing of allies, foreign aid, a
constant economic strategies growth and the costs associated with maintaining the international economy.
However, once equilibrium between the costs and benefits of expansion is reached, the costs of
maintaining the status quo tend to increase more than the capacity to finance the status quo. As a
result, the international system enters a state of disequilibrium. The consequence of continuing a
state of disequilibrium and financial problems is the eventual economic strategies and political strategies decline of the
hegemon (Gilpin 1981: 156-158).
When the hegemon is in a state of decline, certain features appear which this paper will use to
produce the argument that the U.S. is a hegemon in decline.
In a hegemonic state the national income is divided into three sectors: protection of the state,
consumption (welfare ...), and productive reinvestment (schools, universities ...). If the hegemon
declines, the protection and consumption sector tends to receive most of the financial resources that
the economy and the civil society erodes due to cut backs in the sector of productive reinvestment
(Gilpin 1981: 158). If the growth in private and public consumption is greater than the gross national
product, a psychological shift appears inside the society which further undercuts the economic
performance. Moreover internal changes become manifest in the allocation of national income
among protectionism, consumption and investment (Gilpin 1981: 163-166). The amount of free
riding states that benefits from the public goods provided will cost the hegemon more then it
benefits from the cooperation. These costs outweigh the costs the hegemon has by providing ‘public
goods’ which maintain the status quo.
According to Gilpin this gives the hegemon two options: on the one hand “the challenged power can
seek to increase the resources devoted to maintaining its commitments and position in the
international system”, on the other hand “it can attempt to reduce its existing commitments (and
associated costs) in a way that does not ultimately jeopardize its international position” (Gilpin 1981:
188). There is, however, an additional phenomenon occurring in extreme stages of decline, namely
the hegemonic war.
The latter is a war strategies which is raged against the direct or indirect contestants of the hegemon. The
fundamental dispute is over the nature and governance of the system. The condition preceding a
hegemonic war strategies is the perception that a fundamental historic change is taking place. A further
condition is the perception that the course of events begins to escape human control (Gilpin 1981:
199-202).
This form of warfare is an effect of a hegemon in decline which also has additional features as argued
by Gilpin: One reaction of a hegemon in decline might be the launch of a preventive war strategies or the state
may seek to reduce the cost of maintaining its position by means of further expansion (turbulent
frontier thesis). In effect, the state hopes to reduce long term-costs by acquiring less costly defensive
positions. The last feature of brining cost and resources into balance is, of course, to reduce foreign
commitments (Gilpin 1981: 191-192). However, there are many critics which regard the HST as
incorrect.
Since its existence and growing popularity, the theory has been met with criticism. One of the major
critics of this theory is Duncan Snidal. He argues that “the absence of a hegemon is associated with
disorder in the world system and undesirable outcomes for individual states”, whereas “graphical
analysis and a numerical example show that cooperation of multiple states while a hegemon declines
not only can be sustained in the face of declining hegemony, it may even be enhanced” (Snidal 1985:
579-580). Furthermore, he criticises that Gilpin did neither limit nor define the power of a hegemon
which leads to the problem that the HST cannot be falsified (Snidal 1985: 587). In addition, he
criticises that, following the HST argument, collective action is impossible especially if this action
would affect the balance of power in favour of the small, disadvantaged states and consequently
against the hegemon (Snidal 1985: 593, 613).
Another critic is Grunberg who states:
“In the modern world, the emergence of a world market economy was dependent on the pluralistic
structure of the European (and subsequently the global) political strategies system. . . . [The] failure of the
several efforts to unify Europe politically permitted the expansion of a market-type economy. The
absence of an imperial power to organize and control production and exchange gave free rein to
market forces“(Grunberg 1990: 436).
He also mentions that, through certain events, small states might grow substantially quicker than a
hegemon in economic strategies terms. Moreover, he states that a hegemon will not try to sustain the status
quo when the short term profits are very small compared to the long term negative effects
(Grunberg 1990: 441). Grunberg disputes that public goods distributed through the hegemon are
really free since they might be limited or denied and that the HST sometimes appears to be
ethnocentrically favouring the U.S. (Grunberg 1990: 442, 447).
All this criticism is taken into account while the argument is established that the U.S. is in fact a
hegemon according to the definition of this paper.
The U.S. a hegemon
The U.S. hegemony is a not widely disputed fact in political strategies science. Agnew strategies argues that “the main
thrust of contemporary world politics is the result of the particular hegemony exercised by American
society in the rest of the world through the agency of both the U.S. government and a wide range of
other institutions, cooperate, philanthropic, and inter-governmental – whose basic structures and
norms are those of the marketplace society that developed in the United States in the nineteenth
and twentieth century” (Agnew strategies 2005: 1). An example for the U.S. hegemony is given by Grunberg:
(...) When the United States exerted pressures to keep Brazil's hardware market open, its behaviour
was considered typical of a declining hegemon (Grunberg 1990: 438). The current hegemony comes
to a rising price for the United States.
The international community does not share all of the military and administrative costs (e.g. Gulf
War strategies 1991). Furthermore, the international community expects the hegemon to take preventive or
pre-emptive action for their common good. Supplementary, the institutional basis for contemporary
economic strategies and political strategies super governmental organisations were largely under American auspices
(Agnew strategies 2005: 31-32).
Additional examples would be the proxy wars during the cold war strategies period, the influence in the
development of foreign states and the global economic strategies system, the military spending, the amount of
international aid, the influence on global culture and science and finally the per head calorie
consumption.
The HST and the Clinton era
Many argue that the economy in the U.S. undergoes its economic strategies climax (Gilpin 1981: 160). This is a
phenomenon which every service based economy has to deal with. This is based on the predicted
shift of the unequal economic strategies state budget distribution between protection, consumption and
investment (Gilpin 1981: 166). Moreover, there is a big dependency on foreign capital (Gilpin 1981:
17). This downfall of the economy was something Bill Clinton had to deal with. He assumed office
faced with a huge budget deficit which he tried to overcome by raising taxes, blunting the Republican
drive to cut the budget and protecting the spending priorities. In the face of a looming budgetary
surplus, he introduced the link between that surplus and funding future shortfalls in middle-class
entitlement programs (Peri 2000: 37). This budget deficit was something Bill Clinton could not
overcome. In fact, the income inequality which had begun during the years of the Reagan
administration accelerated during the Clinton administration (Tatalovich & Frendreis 2000: 55). He
was aware of this problem and tried to tackle it by establishing the National Economic strategies Council (NEC)
which coordinated the economic strategies policy making (Tatalovich & Frendreis 2000: 45). Unfortunately,
these measures did not prove successful in halting the economic strategies decline.
This was also due to Clinton’s lack of experience in foreign policy during the first term (Peri 2000: 32).
At the beginning of the Clinton era, a lack of direction in the international policy of the U.S. was
visible. Two fundamental points guided Clinton’s foreign policy: on the one hand, establishing liberal
democracies and on the other hand, the creation of free market societies (McCormick 2000: 60). The
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) were leftovers of the Bush administration. The ratification process of GATT can be seen as a
further example for the still powerful hegemonic status of the U.S. despite its decline. The House and
the Senate voted for GATT by a big bipartisan majority because of the existence of a trigger
mechanism allowing congress to vote to withdraw from GATT if the United States was subjected to
unfair rulings by the Court of International trade (Tatalovich & Frendreis 2000: 49).
An example for the economic strategies decline of the U.S. might be seen when examining the foreign policy of
Clinton regarding China. At first Clinton did not want to cooperate with the Chinese in the economic
sphere because of their poor human rights records, but then did he changed his mind because the
economic strategies advantage was crucial for sustaining U.S. hegemony (Peri 2000: 33).
Another action which can be regarded as a move to sustain the U.S. hegemony was the withdrawal
from international obligations. “Instead of decisive action in Bosnia as Clinton had promised, within
several month of taking office Secretary of State Christopher rejected the possibility of the United
States stopping ethnic killing” (Peri 2000: 33). This can be evaluated as a move of a hegemon which
tries to sustain its power by withdrawing from commitments abroad. The example of Kosovo would
further sustain this argument. Clinton acted out of a moral imperative to help the people in Kosovo,
but he also justified his action as an effort to defend the U.S. national interest by presenting the
further expansion of the conflict(McCormick 2000: 60). The reason for the intervention was that the
short term costs were lower than the cost in a worst-case scenario would have been. In the second
term however, Clinton pursued a more elaborate foreign policy. Clinton “committed the United
States to global engagement and leadership, he also indicated that America would pursue
cooperative ties with other powerful nations, seek to adapt and build sound economic strategies and security
institutions in the international community, and support democracy and human rights” (McCormick
2000: 65). This statement shows that the U.S. was promoting itself as a hegemon in a positive sense
where the U.S. was the leading power which would unite enemies.
”The United States was committed to a global role; it would act unilaterally or multilaterally,
depending on the circumstances, to achieve its goals; and it would use American force if necessary”
(McCormick 2000: 64). This new strategies agenda was more aggressive and more coordinated to promote a
U.S. interest. Seeing the goals set, it might come as a surprise that Clinton’s main policy making was
not directed at foreign policy but at domestic issues (Tatalovich & Frendreis 2000: 46). The
Millennium Goals are further prove of a more ambitious and elaborate security foreign policy. The
goal was to build a future in which the people will be safe from proliferation, terrorism, drugs and
the effects of climate change (McCormick 2000: 66). This goal helped Clinton to justify a reformation
of the military which will aid the future reformation by Rumsfeld. The Clinton administration wanted
to improve the quality of the forces and save money at the same time. “The Clinton administration’s
Bottom-up Review outlined the kind of new strategies military that it sought – a military that was smaller, more
mobile, and more capable of new strategies missions for the changing threat environment” (Tatalovich &
Frendreis 2000: 61).
This highlights another aspect of the hegemonic decline which is that the American military has
increasingly become a force composed of the less educated and the unskilled. Consequently, the
costs for the military tend to grow disproportionally whereas the quality of the military declines
(Gilpin 1981: 163). This reform aimed at one of the fundamental problems of the hegemonic decline
which is the imbalance between the cost benefit of state organs.
Furthermore, the Clinton administration’s enlarged Somalia mission which included a nation building
goals failed in 1993. The Somalia experience paralyzed the administration; therefore it did very little
when Rwanda erupted in genocide in 1994 (McCormick 2000: 67-68). This inefficiency is best
summarized by Miller: “Citing the lack of a convincing world view, poorly articulated goals and
ineffectual means, plus a confusing agenda in Europe, many observers have essentially deemed the
Clinton years a failure in foreign policy terms” (Miller 1994: 634). These mostly empty foreign
promises combined with the failure to act as a decisive leader of the world community hints towards
the policy of a declining hegemon which prefers to save resources. Even the economic strategies goals of GATT
and NAFTA took enormous time and energy to take off (Miller 1994: 624).
This administration managed to foster national unity through foreign defeat (Miller 1994: 634). This
polarization together with the growing state debt, the withdrawal from foreign commitments, the
commitment to small government and the declining control over allies can be seen as indicators for a
declining hegemon.
Hegemonic war strategies and the GWB administration
A new strategies foreign policy era began with GWB. Before 9/11, “Bush singled out three threats requiring
particular attention: Russia, China, and rouge countries, such as Iraq and North Korea” (Dietrich
2005: 16). Despite his claims that the U.S. would fight injustice he did nothing against the killings in
East Timor (Chomsky 2003: 53). It seems to be quite a common feature of the GWB foreign policy to
pay less attention towards issues concerning human rights than to matters which direct or indirectly
affect U.S. interest.
An example sustaining that claim is that in his election campaign, GWB merely made passing
references to problems like global poverty, the spread of diseases such as AIDS and environmental
issues (Dietrich 2005: 14). “Most dramatically, in sharp contrast to both liberal internationalist and
neo-conservative views, Bush argued that the United States should not use its military for purely
humanitarian missions and nation building” (Dietrich 2005: 16). These pre 9/11 policies and speeches
clearly indicate that U.S. policy under GWB can be described as conservative and neo realistic. As
early as in 1999 he defined the fight against terrorism as his foreign policy goal (Dietrich 2005: 24).
This goal seemed to be as unrealistic in 1999 as it was 2001 because of the following reason. “(...) it is
not clear that the United States can economically afford to prosecute a war strategies without end on terrorism
or its perceived cultural and political strategies opponents without the active cooperation of its previous allies
and without sacrificing the very values and interests that it was is supposedly all about”(Agnew strategies 2005:
27). This economic strategies aspect regarding the plan to play a bigger role in foreign policy are not
financeable because of three reasons: First, because of the growing dependency on foreign goods
and second, because of the lack of a foreign threat which could bring the U.S. and its allies closer
together (Agnew strategies 2005: 29-30). Finally, the U.S. has seen the return of the ‘twin deficits’ problem:
massive government overspending to pay for a growing military, plus increased demands for tax cuts
for the rich which increases the dependency of the local economy on foreign credits and thus
increases the trade and account deficit (Agnew strategies 2005: 228). 9/11 exacerbated this grave economic
situation. The disequilibrium between protection, consumption and investment was now totally out
of control. There was also a big break between the GWB administration and international
organisations.
The attitude of the administration towards the United Nation is best summarized by the U.S.
ambassador for the UN, John Bolton: “There is no such thing as the United Nations. There is an
international community that can be led by the only real power left in the world, and that is the
United States, when it suits our interest and when we can get others to go along” (Callinicos 2003:
76). This statement underlines the argument of critics of the HST and those critics who doubt that
the U.S. power is declining. Strange would argue that this style of foreign policy shows that the
structural power of the U.S. actually increased and that collective action is actually possible but only
with the U.S., not against it (Strange 1987: 557, 574). This seems to be a clear cut between the
international community and the U.S. which is also demonstrated by Chomsky:
“The proof that the system (UN) is hot air is straightforward: Washington made it clear that it intends
to do all it can to maintain its pre-eminence, then announced that it would ignore the UN security
council over Iraq and declared more broadly that it would no longer be bound by the UN Charter’s
rules governing the use of force” (Chomsky 2003: 13).
Further examples include the U.S. boycotting talks regarding the demilitarization of space (Chomsky
2003: 232). Moreover, one should mention the break with the Kyoto protocol on global warming, the
denunciation of the treaty establishing an international criminal court, the resignation from the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty and the disregard for UN institutions (Callinicos 2003: 17). These are policies
can be evaluated as policy of a realist. Moreover, all those actions can be justified under the premise
that a fundamental historical change is taking place and that the course of events begins to escape
human control. These hegemonic policies combined with 9/11 brought a new strategies dawn for the American
people. In addition, following the definition given by Gilpin, these policies are the features of a
hegemonic war strategies which is fought under the perception that there is a threat to fundamental values.
GWB demonstrated that this is an exceptional time where in a war strategies is fought between the
fundamental forces of good against the evil in the world (Whitehouse 2003). This clearly shows that
“the post-September 11, 2001, tendency of the Bush administration toward an increasingly brazen
imperial strategy, taking off from its systematic attempts at disabling a number of international in
activities (...) is undoubtedly the fruit of a new strategies ideological commitment to empire rather than to
other means of securing hegemony” (Agnew strategies 2005: 35). This tendency to polarize through a new
foreign policy was further reflected through the invasion in Iraq. The invasion of Iraq was a further
indicator for a hegemonic war.
Also, there was “a burst of measures to protect domestic manufacturing industries and agribusiness,
and retreat from many types of multilateral commitment are indicative of the U.S. government’s
reactions to perceived military and economic strategies threats”(Agnew strategies 2005:224). This war strategies is raged to protect
US domestic economic strategies interest. The connection between the administration and parts of the U.S.
economy which is directly profit from the war, is not a coincident. “A good example (...) is provided
by the current US Vice President, Dick Cheney, who still receives deferred compensation with up to 1
million dollar a year from Halliburton, the oil company that he used to head and that was one of the
six big American corporations invited secretly to bid for work to reconstruct Iraq (…)”(Callinicos 2003:
31-32). Another aspect of the Iraq war strategies which underlines hegemonic interests are the resources and
markets which are now open to the U.S. Nonetheless, this hegemonic war strategies has extreme implications
for the U.S. foreign policy and domestic affairs.
Agnew strategies argues that the war strategies on terror put the U.S. government at odds with many other governments
including many of its nominal allies in NATO, with international organisations and with itself ,
domestically , having passed the Patriot act and other anti-subversive legislation. Furthermore, the
war strategies showed “(...) the lack of support by other governments for the U.S. invasion of Iraq which
suggests a significant erosion of U.S. legitimacy” (Agnew strategies 2005: 19, 225). This erosion did not just
affect foreign policy but also Americans civil society as anybody can be a enemy combatant or a
suspected terrorists and be imprisoned without charges or access to lawyers or family until the
White House determines that its war strategies on terror has been successfully concluded; that is, indefinitely
(Chomsky 2003: 26). GWB showed the citizens and the world that the hegemon is at war strategies and there is
just one decision to be made by everybody: "You're either with us or against us in the fight against
terror” (CNN 2001). Supplementary, “Cheney-Rumsfeld-Powell and their associates are officially
declaring an even more extreme policy, one aimed at permanent global hegemony by reliance on
force if necessary” (Chomsky 2003: 16). This policy shows that the GWB administration clearly
pictures the war strategies on terror as a fundamental war strategies for the values and the status quo of the world order.
Critics who disagree that the U.S. is a declining hegemon assert that the U.S. is a country with elite
universities and has a very strong currency. Moreover, they claim that half of the top 300 companies
are in the U.S. and that, most importantly, the U.S. has the most powerful military in the world
(Strange 1987: 567-570). All these arguments can be neglected when looking at the role the U.S. is
playing in contemporary international politics.
Conclusion
The HST is widely disputed and can be regarded as a realist world view which is naturally challenged
by liberalists and neo Marxists. This paper states that, despite most criticism, the U.S. is even
considered a hegemon by critics of the HST.
The HST states that a hegemon is in decline when the costs for maintaining the status quo outweigh
the benefits. Furthermore, disequilibrium in the state expenditure appears which the hegemon
endeavours to balance by withdrawing from foreign commitments.
These indicators could be observed during the Clinton administration. Clinton tried to balance the
budget by cutbacks inside the government. Moreover, he attempted to widen international
cooperation and by doing so, reduce U.S. commitment abroad. This policy can still be regarded as
hegemonic since a hegemon might use cooperation tactics in order to minimize costs. The
disequilibrium in the state budget could not be balanced as the amount of spending for defence and
commodities was much higher than the amount paid for reinvestment.
The failure to respond efficiently in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Rwanda combined with a clear
disconnect between the goals, which were set rhetorically but were followed by insufficient actions,
led to the conclusion that the U.S. is incapable of fulfilling its task as a hegemon. Therefore, it can be
argued that the U.S. is a declining hegemon.
The era of GWB clearly showed the strong ambitions to restore hegemony but also a polarized
society which is fearful of the economic strategies decline and the threat of terrorism. The terror attack of 9/11
gave the GWB administration the momentum to enact a hegemonic war strategies which enabled the
government to tighten its control over the economy, its allies and foreign resources. Furthermore, it
can be argued that the ‘War strategies on Terror’ is in fact a tool the administration uses to justify its aggressive
tactics with the goal to regain the hegemonic power lost. However, this goal will not be reached due
to the economic strategies and foreign relations problems which the administration encounters.
Clearly, a different approach in evaluating the administrations’ policies is possible. Nevertheless, the
evaluation of the two administrations using the HST can be regarded as logical and neo realistic.
In conclusion, the HST cannot be completely assessed because of the limited frame set in this essay.
The two administrations clearly show indications of a hegemon in decline which were analysed by
Gilpin. Unfortunately is it impossible to measure the rate of the decline due to the fact that
hegemonic power is not measurable. Moreover, the match between the HST and the politics of the
two administrations can be a historical coincident. Finally, the GWB administration is still in power
and a final evaluation of their policy in respect to the historical implications is therefore impossible.
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